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THE UNCERTAIN CASE AGAINST THE
DOUBLE TAXATION OF CORPORATE
INCOME
JEFFREY L. KWALLt
Recent commentators have criticized the double taxation of distrib-
uted corporate income both as an inequitable tax that imposes greater
tax burdens on individual shareholders than other taxpayers and as an
inefficient tax that distorts the economic decisions of taxpayers. These
scholars have called for "integration," the elimination of a corporate tax
on distributed corporate income. Yet, integration certainly would mean
loss of tax revenues and would require Congress to maintain tax reve-
nues by alternative methods. In this Article Professor Jeffrey L. Kwall
asserts that proponents of integration largely have failed to consider this
revenue need constraint. The author questions the prudence of eliminat-
ing the double taxation of distributed corporate income because it may
jeopardize recent tax reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and eq-
uity of our tax system.
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e I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate income that is distributed to individual shareholders is taxed
twice. Corporate income is subject to the corporate tax when earned.I In addi-
1. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1989). But see id. § 1363(a) (providing that no corporate tax is imposed
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tion, corporate income is subject to the individual income tax when dividends
are paid. 2 By contrast, income from all other sources is subject only to the indi-
vidual income tax.3 As a result, corporate income distributed as dividends is
taxed more heavily than income derived by an individual from any other
source.
4:
Commentators frequently criticize the double taxation of corporate income
as contrary to the tax policy goals of equity and efficiency. 5 An income tax is
equitable when individuals with equal incomes bear equal tax burdens, irrespec-
tive of the sources from which their incomes are derived.6 Critics of double
taxation claim that double taxation is inequitable because individuals receiving
corporate income bear a heavier tax burden than similarly situated persons de-
riving their incomes from noncorporate sources.7 An efficient tax does not
change the economic decisions that individuals would make in the absence of the
tax.8 Critics claim that double taxation is inefficient because it causes taxpayers
to avoid those alternatives that are subject to double taxation. 9 The implications
of double taxation on equity and efficiency have led many to conclude that dis-
tributed corporate income should be relieved from the burden of the corporate
tax. 10 This form of relief from double taxation is referred to as "integration."' 1
on an electing small business corporation; i.e., an "S Corporation"). The primary focus of this
Article is on publicly held corporations that do not qualify for S Corporation status.
2. Id. § 1. When corporate income is distributed to the corporation's shareholders, it is
treated as dividends. Id. §§ 301, 316. Dividends are included in the gross income of the recipient.
Id. § 61(a)(7). If corporate stock is sold before dividends are paid, undistributed corporate income
generally will be taxed to the selling shareholder as a gain derived from the sale of stock-assuming
that the undistributed income will increase the value, and therefore the price, of the stock. See id.
§§ 61(a)(3), 1001.
3. Id. § 61.
4. Under existing law, the maximum corporate tax rate is 34% and the maximum individual
tax rate is 28%. Id. §§ 1, 11. But see id. §§ l(g), ll(b)(1) (imposing additional tax on limited range
of income). Thus, $1,000,000 of corporate income is subject to a corporate tax of $340,000. If the
$660,000 that remains is distributed as dividends, an additional tax of $184,800 is imposed ($660,000
x 28% = $184,800). Thus, total taxes of $524,800 are imposed on $1,000,000 of corporate source
income. By contrast, $1,000,000 of income from any other source would be subject only to an
individual income tax of $280,000.
5. See C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 19-49 (1979); McLure,
Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Re-
form Proposals, 88 HARv. L. REV. 532, 534-49 (1975); Warren, The Relation and Integration of
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 721-38 (1981).
6. This is the principle of "horizontal equity." R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FI-
NANCE 160, 173 (1959).
7. See McLure, supra note 5, at 535, 537-42; infra notes 75-105 and accompanying text.
8. When a tax causes an economic decision to be made differently than it would have been
made in the absence of the tax, the taxpayer generally bears a burden in excess of the tax itself. The
tax creates an inefficiency because it makes one person worse off without conferring a corresponding
benefit on anyone else. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 291-312 (4th ed. 1984).
9. See Warren, supra note 5, at 736-38. Specifically, double taxation may bias individuals
against investing in the corporate sector, bias corporations against utilizing equity financing, and bias
corporations against undertaking profitable investments. See infra notes 148-75 and accompanying
text.
10. See, eg., McLure, supra note 5, at 558-61, 581-82 (favoring Carter Approach of distribution
and allocation); Bravenec, A NontraditionalApproach to Corporate Integration, 42 TAX NOTES 1381,
1381-82 (1989) (proposing continuation of corporate tax and no corporate deductions for distribu-
tions but suggesting that dividend not be included in taxable income of distributee); Steuerle, A
Simplified Integrated Tax, 44 TAX NOTES 335, 335-36 (1989) (proposing no separate tax on distribu-
1990]
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The case against double taxation as developed in the legal literature is inad-
equate because it fails to address the requirement that the tax system raise a
given amount of revenue. 12 If a need for revenue did not constrain tax reform,
efforts to further equity and efficiency logically would lead to the elimination of
all taxes. The realistic reform goal, therefore, is to minimize on a system-wide
basis the adverse impact on equity and efficiency of a tax system required to
generate a given amount of revenue.13 The need to balance reform against reve-
nue production is particularly pertinent in the current legislative climate. 14
Relieving corporate income from double taxation would result in a signifi-
cant loss of revenue.' 5 Double taxation, therefore, should be evaluated from a
perspective that considers the ramifications of an alternative revenue source. To
determine whether integration is desirable, the equity and efficiency gains
achieved by eliminating double taxation must be weighed against the equity and
efficiency costs incurred by utilizing an alternative revenue source.
Individuals with high incomes most likely will be the primary beneficiaries
of integration because these individuals tend to concentrate their wealth in cor-
porate stock and receive a high proportion of the dividend income.16 To com-
tions); Warren, supra note 5, at 798-99 (proposing either shareholder credit or dividend deduction
for corporation); Warren, Recent Corporate Restructuring and the Corporate Tax System, 42 TAX
NOTES 715, 719-20 (1989) (proposing shareholder credit).
11. This Article uses the term "integration" to refer to the elimination of the double tax on
distributed corporate income in a system in which a discrete corporate tax is applied to undistributed
earnings. See Warren, supra note 5, at 739. Other commentators refer to the foregoing approach as
"partial integration" and use the term "integration" to describe a more drastic approach that would
eliminate the corporate tax and cause all corporate income, distributed or undistributed, to be taxed
immediately to the individual shareholders. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 5, at 550-61. This Article
uses the term "allocation" to refer to the taxation of all corporate earnings, distributed or undistrib-
uted, directly to the individual shareholders in a system that does not utilize a corporate tax. See
Warren, supra note 5, at 739.
Although the double taxation of distributed earnings might be eliminated by removing the bur-
den of either the corporate tax or the individual income tax from such earnings, it generally entails
eliminating the corporate tax. See infra note 104.
12. Indeed, the legal literature has been critical of justifying double taxation on revenue
grounds. See infra notes 74 & 212 and accompanying text. By contrast, the economics literature
has acknowledged the importance of assessing a reform proposal against a revenue constraint. See
infra note 213 and accompanying text.
13. See Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 98-102 (1976).
14. Congress is facing immense revenue needs under the revised Gramm-Rudman-Hollings leg-
islation. See The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987). Under the legislation, automatic spending cuts will be trig-
gered unless the budget deficit is reduced to $100 billion in fiscal 1990, $64 billion in fiscal 1991, $28
billion in fiscal 1992, and $0 in fiscal 1993. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
15. A 1984 Treasury proposal to allow corporations to deduct half of the dividends paid to
shareholders was estimated by Treasury to lead to a $38 billion revenue loss for fiscal year 1990. 1
TREASURY DEP'T REPORT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
248 (1984); see also Brady Offers Sermon on Capital Gains Cut and Corporate Integration to the
Converted, 44 TAX NOTES 1311, 1311 (1989) (Treasury official concedes that revenue loss from
integration would be about $40 billion).
16. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, PRO-
POSALS ON CORPORATE ACQuISITONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPO-
RATE DISTRIBUTIONS 328 (1982) (Integration "would only be accomplished at a substantial cost in
... progressivity, since a high proportion of dividends flow to high income, wealthy individuals.");
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUC-
TURES 57 (1989) [hereinafter CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES] ("high tax rate taxpayers will
tend to concentrate their wealth in the form of equity"); infra note 107.
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pensate for the loss of revenue without dramatically changing the distribution of
tax burdens among income classes, 17 the elimination of double taxation would
require a tax increase directed at high-income individuals. This tax increase
would be likely to take the form of higher tax rates.' 8 From an equity stand-
point, higher tax rates would exacerbate the differences between individuals who
pay tax on all of their income and similarly situated individuals who exploit
omissions from the tax base ("preferences") to minimize their tax liabilities.
From an efficiency standpoint, higher tax rates would increase the desirability of
those economic alternatives that exploit tax preferences and thereby augment
the extent to which the tax system distorts economic decisions. Moreover,
higher tax rates probably would increase the pressure on Congress to create ad-
ditional preferences.1 9
Higher individual tax rates and additional preferences would jeopardize the
gains in equity and efficiency achieved by recent tax reform efforts. These re-
form efforts have moved United States law toward a low rate, broad-based in-
come tax.20 A low rate, broad-based tax system leads to substantial gains in
equity and efficiency by reducing the number of preferences that create the po-
tential for different treatment of similarly situated individuals and by moderat-
ing the potential benefits associated with those preferences that remain. 21 An
increase in individual income taxes would reverse the recent reform trend. Con-
sequently, the extent to which equity and efficiency are compromised by perpet-
uating double taxation may be a relatively small price to pay to keep the reform
effort on its current course.
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that double taxation can be
reconciled with equity and efficiency when the adverse implications of an alter-
native revenue source are considered. Part II provides an historical overview of
double taxation. Part III states the case against double taxation on equitable
grounds. Part IV critiques the equitable perspective on double taxation and
demonstrates that substituting higher tax rates for double taxation probably
would lead to a more inequitable tax structure. Part V states the case against
17. This Article assumes that the existing allocation of tax burdens among income classes re-
flects the allocation desired by society. See McLure, supra note 5, at 535 (evaluates double taxation
assuming progressivity is desirable social goal). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was intended to main-
tain the relative distribution of tax burdens among income classes, which reinforces this view. See
infra note 51 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the allocation of tax burdens among income classes that should exist as a
normative matter, see Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905 (1987); Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progres-
sive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1952).
18. See infra note 129. Economists who have explored the elimination of double taxation in a
revenue-neutral manner connect an increase in individual income tax rates to integration. See, e.g.,
Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J. POL. ECON. 29, 46-48 (Pt. 2 1978);
Fullerton, King, Shoven & Whalley, Corporate Tax Integration in the United States: A General
Equilibrium Approach, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 677, 683-90 (1981).
19. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
20. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 101-44, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-121;
infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 133-43, 233-40. See generally Yorio, Equity, Efficiency
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987) (demonstrating gains in equity
and efficiency derived from movement toward broad-based, low rate tax system).
1990]
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double taxation on efficiency grounds. Part VI critiques the efficiency perspec-
tive and demonstrates that substituting higher tax rates for double taxation
probably would lead to a less efficient tax structure. The Article concludes that
equity and efficiency may be better served by refining a low rate, broad-based
income tax than by increasing individual taxes to compensate for the revenue
loss from integration.
II. DOUBLE TAXATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Congress has yet to define the relationship between the corporate tax and
the individual income tax.22 Instead, Congress generally has treated the corpo-
rate tax and the individual income tax as discrete taxes. As a result, the magni-
tude of the tax burden on distributed corporate income has evolved largely by
chance.
A. Earliest Laws Precluded Double Taxation (1861-1935)
The earliest tax laws treated the corporation as a mere extension of its
shareholders. Accordingly, corporate income was taxed only once. From 1861
to 1873, no discrete corporate tax was imposed.23 Instead, corporate income
was included in the tax base of shareholders and subjected immediately to the
individual income tax, irrespective of whether dividends were paid.24
Although the next round of tax legislation did treat the corporation as a
separate entity, these laws continued to ensure that corporate income was not
taxed twice. From 1894 to 1895, individuals and corporations paid taxes at a
uniform rate of two percent. 25 Dividends, however, were excluded from the
individual income tax base.26 Thus, although corporate income was taxed to the
corporation, it was not taxed a second time when dividends were paid.27
Beginning in 1913, corporate income was subject to two levels of taxation.
For more than two decades, however, a structural limitation on the double taxa-
tion of corporate income served as an integral part of the income tax laws.
From 1913 to 1935, corporations paid a flat rate tax on their earnings. 28 By
22. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 136 (5th ed. 1987).
23. The first U.S. income tax law was the Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292, 309. This
Act was superseded by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 473, which, in turn, was
superseded by the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281. The 1864 Act, as amended,
remained in effect until 1873. See Act of 1874, § 3140, 18 Stat. 604. No further tax legislation was
enacted until 1894. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24. Section 117 of the 1864 Act explicitly provided for the inclusion of corporate income in the
tax base of the shareholders. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82. Section 117
was upheld in Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
25. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27, 32, 28 Stat. 509, 553, 556.
26. Id. § 28, 28 Stat. at 553-54.
27. In 1895, the 1894 Act was declared unconstitutional as a direct tax not properly appor-
tioned among the states. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637-38 (1895). No
further income taxes were enacted until the sixteenth amendment was ratified. See U.S. CoNST.
amend. XVI (ratified Feb. 25, 1913). Congress did enact an excise tax, however, that applied only to
corporations, in the Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112, the constitutionality of
which was sustained in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 161 (1910).
28. See infra note 32 (Col. I).
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contrast, individuals paid both a flat rate "normal" tax and a progressive rate
"additional" tax on their incomes. 29 Dividends, however, were exempt from
the individual "normal" tax.30 Thus, although corporate income was taxed
twice, a crude sort of credit was given for the corporate tax when dividends were
paid.3 1 As a result, corporate income did not bear a significantly greater tax
burden than noncorporate income during this period.32
B. Creation of Double Taxation Was Inadvertent (1936)
Beginning in 1936, dividends were no longer accorded relief from the indi-
29. See infra note 32 (Cols. 2 & 3).
30. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167-68; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§ 5(b), 39 Stat. 756, 759-60; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 216,40 Stat. 1057, 1069; Revenue Act of
1921, ch. 136, § 216, 42 Stat. 227, 242-43; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 216, 43 Stat. 253, 272;
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 216(a), 44 Stat. 9, 29; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 25(a), 45 Stat.
795, 802-03; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 25(a), 47 Stat. 169, 184; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 25(a)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 692.
31. The credit was crude for two reasons. First, there was no gross up for the corporate tax
paid. See infra note 98 (explaining gross up). Second, the corporate tax rate often exceeded the
individual normal tax rate. See infra note 32 (compare Column 4 to sum of Columns 2 and 3).
32. Maximum corporate tax rates, maximum individual tax rates, and effective tax rates on
corporate income distributed as a dividend to an individual in the highest tax bracket during this
period were as follows:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maximum Effective Tax Rate on
Maximum Individual Individual Corporate Income
Corporate Normal Additional Distributed as a
Years Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Dividend
1913-15 1.00% 1.00% 6.00% 6.94%
1916 2.00% 2.00% 13.00% 14.74%
1917 6.00% 4.00% 63.00% 65.23%
1918 12.00% 12.00% 65.00% 69.20%
1919-21 10.00% 8.00% 65.00% 68.50%
1922-23 12.50% 8.00% 50.00% 56.25%
1924 12.50% 6.00% 40.00% 47.50%
1925 13.00% 5.00% 20.00% 30.40%
1926-27 13.50% 5.00% 20.00% 30.80%
1928 12.00% 5.00% 20.00% 29.60%
1929 11.00% 4.00% 20.00% 28.80%
1930-31 12.00% 5.00% 20.00% 29.60%
1932-33 13.75% 8.00% 55.00% 61.19%
1934-35 13.75% 4.00% 59.00% 64.64%
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ II(A)I, II(A)2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§§ 1, 10, 39 Stat. 756, 756-57, 765-66; Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, §§ 1, 2, 4, 40 Stat. 300, 300-301,
302; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 210, 211, 230, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062-64, 1075-76; Revenue Act of
1921, ch. 136, §§ 210, 211, 230, 42 Stat. 227, 233-37, 252; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 210, 211,
230, 43 Stat. 253, 264-67, 282; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 210, 211, 230, 44 Stat. 9, 21-23, 39;
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 11, 12, 13, 45 Stat. 791, 795-97; Joint Resolution Reducing Rates
of Income Tax for 1929, ch. 2, 46 Stat. 47 (1929) (reducing rates only for 1929); Revenue Act of
1932, ch. 209, §§ 11-13, 47 Stat. 169, 174-77; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 11-13, 48 Stat. 680,
684-86. For tax rates for years after 1935, see infra note 39.
For a discussion of the formula used to compute the effective tax rate on corporate income
distributed as a dividend, see Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: Crusade Without a
Cause?, 5 VA. TAX REv. 223, 229 n.28 (1985).
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vidual normal tax.33 The impetus for the Revenue Act of 1936 was the per-
ceived undertaxation of undistributed corporate income. On March 3, 1936,
President Roosevelt suggested that Congress enact a tax on undistributed corpo-
rate income to compensate for the omission of undistributed profits from the
base of the progressive individual additional tax.34 The President apparently
believed that distributed corporate income could be taxed adequately under the
individual income tax. Thus, the President also proposed that the regular corpo-
rate tax be repealed and that dividends be included in the individual normal tax
base. The effect of the President's proposals with respect to distributed profits,
therefore, was to substitute the individual normal tax for the old corporate tax.
Quite clearly, the intention was not to augment the burdens on distributed cor-
porate income, since existing law was regarded as taxing dividends too heavily.35
The House subsequently passed a tax bill that adopted all of the President's
proposals. 36 The Senate, however, passed a bill that entailed a less stringent
undistributed profits tax than the House bill. In addition, the Senate bill re-
tained the existing corporate tax, yet failed to exempt dividend income from the
individual normal tax.3 7 Ultimately, the bill that was enacted included an un-
distributed profits tax that was closer to the House version. As a concession to
the Senate, however, the new law both retained the existing corporate tax and
failed to exempt dividend income from the individual normal tax.38 Thus, for
the first time in history, distributed corporate income was subjected not only to
the corporate tax and the individual additional tax, but also to the individual
normal tax. Although the inclusion of dividend income in the individual normal
tax base was but an incidental element of the 1936 Act, it was the seed from
which double taxation germinated.
C. Structural Buffers Neutralized Double Taxation (1936-1986)
For the next five decades, corporate-source income did not bear a signifi-
cantly greater burden than other forms of individual income, notwithstanding
that dividend income was included in the individual normal tax base. The po-
tential burdens of double taxation were buffered during this period by several
structural features: namely, high individual tax rates, lower corporate tax rates,
and preferential treatment of capital gains.
The first tax on corporate-source income (the corporate tax) did not cause
corporate income to bear a burden significantly greater than this income would
have borne had it been subjected only to the individual income tax because indi-
vidual tax rates were quite high during most of this period. From 1936 to 1980,
the maximum individual tax rate ranged from seventy percent to ninety-four
33. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648.
34. For the text of President Roosevelt's historic address, see 1939-1 C.B. 667.
35. See A. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX 22 (1937) ("The existing law was
regarded as taxing too heavily the dividends going to stockholders who really needed them."),
36. For a detailed discussion of the House bill, see id. at 24-28.
37. For a detailed discussion of the Senate bill, see id. at 29-30.
38. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; see A. BUEHLER, supra note 35, at 30-31.
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percent. 39 By virtue of these high individual tax rates, much of the income ab-
sorbed by the corporate tax during this period would have been absorbed by the
individual income tax had the corporate tax not been imposed.40 In 1981, the
maximum individual tax rate declined to fifty percent. 41 The corporate tax base,
however, was curtailed dramatically at the same time.42 Consequently, the first-
level tax still did not impose a significant burden.
39. Maximum corporate tax rates, maximum individual tax rates, and effective tax rates on
corporate income distributed as a dividend to an individual in the highest tax bracket during this
period were as follows:
(1) (2) (3)
Effective Tax Rate on
Maximum Maximum Corporate Income
Corporate Individual Distributed as a
Years Tax Rate Tax Rate Dividend
1936-1937 15.00% 79.0% 82.15%
1938-1939 19.00% 79.0% 82.46%
1940 22.10% 79.0% 83.64%
1941 31.00% 81.0% 86.89%
1942-1943 40.00% 88.0% 92.90%
1944-1945 40.00% 94.0% 96.40%
1946-1947 38.00% 86.4% 91.57%
1948-1949 38.00% 82.1% 88.90%
1950 42.00% 84.4% 90.95%
1951 50.75% 91.0% 95.57%
1952-1953 52.00% 92.0% 96.16%
1954-1963 52.00% 91.0% 93.76%
1964 50.00% 77.0% 87.50%
1965-1978 48.00% 70.0% 84.40%
1979-1980 46.00% 70.0% 83.80%
1981-1985 46.00% 50.0% 73.00%
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 11-13, 48 Stat. 680, 684-86; Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, §§ 101-
02, 49 Stat. 1014, 1014-15; Revenue Act of 1938, cl. 289, §§ 11-13, 52 Stat. 447, 452-55; Second
Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 101(a), 54 Stat. 974 (amending I.R.C. § 13(b) (1939)); Revenue Act
of 1941, ch. 412, §§ 101, 103(a), 104(a), 55 Stat. 687, 688-89, 692-93 (amending I.R.C. §§ 12(g),
13(b), 15 (1939)); Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 102, 103, 105(b), 56 Stat. 798, 802-03, 805-06
(amending I.R.C. §§ 11, 12(b), 13(b), 15 (1939)); Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, §§ 3,
4(a), 58 Stat. 231, 231-32 (amending I.R.C. §§ 11, 12(g) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1945, ch. 453,
§§ 101(c), 121(a), 59 Stat. 556, 558, 568 (amending I.R.C. §§ 12(g), 15(b) (1939)); Revenue Act of
1948, ch. 168, § 101, 62 Stat. 110, 111 (amending I.R.C. § 12(c) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1950, ch.
994, §§ 101, 121(a), 64 Stat. 906, 910-11,914-15 (amending I.R.C. §§ 12(c), 13, 15 (1939)); Revenue
Act of 1951, ch. 521, §§ 101(b), 121(a), 121(f), 65 Stat. 452, 459-61, 465-66, 468 (amending I.R.C.
§§ 12(f), 13, 15 (1939)); Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, §§ 111, 121, 78 Stat. 19, 19-23,
25; Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763, 2820; Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82.
For a discussion of the formulae for computing the effective tax rate on corporate income dis-
tributed as a dividend during this period, see Kwall, supra note 32, at 240 n.84, 249 n.121.
40. The corporate tax imposed a somewhat greater burden in the case of individual sharehold-
ers taxed at lower marginal rates.
41. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82.
42. The 1981 Act expanded the tax benefits associated with accelerated depreciation and the
investment tax credit to the point at which "many firms were expected to be made completely non-
taxable." Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1364 (1987); see CONGREs-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 24-25 (1985). These benefits
were curtailed to some extent even prior to the 1986 Act. See id. at 25-26.
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The second tax on corporate income (the individual income tax) often im-
posed little additional burden on corporate income during the period from 1936
to 1986. Because corporate income is not subject to the individual income tax
until dividends are paid, the second tax on corporate income often can be de-
ferred indefinitely.43 The ability to defer the second tax reduced its cost in pres-
ent value terms because corporate tax rates during this period were lower than
individual tax rates.44 The ability to defer the second tax also facilitated the
conversion of potential dividend income to capital gains when shareholders sold
their stock before dividends were paid.45 Because capital gains were taxed at
lower rates than dividend income,46 the individual tax imposed on corporate-
source income often was less than the individual tax imposed on income from
other sources. In sum, high individual tax rates, lower corporate rates, and pref-
erential treatment of capital gains generally precluded corporate income from
bearing a burden greater than that imposed on noncorporate income.47
43. The corporate level penalty taxes, which apply primarily to closely held corporations, limit
the ability to defer the second tax on corporate income. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 223-58. Many
closely held corporations can avoid double taxation entirely by electing S Corporation status. See
I.R.C. §§ 1361-1378 (West 1989). This Article focuses primarily on publicly held corporations that
generally are outside of the scope of the penalty tax provisions. But see id. § 532(c) (imposing accu-
mulated earnings tax on corporations formed for the purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to
shareholders).
44. The maximum corporate tax rate always was less than the maximum individual tax rate
during this period. See supra note 39, Cols. I & 2).
A benefit is derived from deferral only if the returns on the deferred income are taxed at a lesser
rate than the rate of tax that would be imposed on the deferred income if deferral were not possible.
Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 501 (1986). For example, assume that a
corporation has $1,000 of earnings after paying the corporate tax, the corporate tax rate is 30%, the
individual tax rate is 50%, and both the corporation and its shareholders can earn a pretax return of
10% from investments. If the corporation invests the $1,000, it would earn $100 on which it would
pay a tax of $30. If the corporation then paid a dividend of the $1,070 that remained, the individual
shareholder would pay a tax of $535 on the dividend. Thus, the shareholder would net $535 after all
taxes were paid. By contrast, if the corporation paid a dividend of the $1,000 rather than investing it,
the shareholder would pay a tax of $500 and have $500 to invest. When the shareholder invests the
$500, the shareholder would earn $50 on which the shareholder would pay a tax of $25. Thus, the
shareholder would net $525 after all taxes were paid. Because the individual tax rate exceeds the
corporate tax rate in this example, total tax liabilities are reduced where the earnings are accumu-
lated in the corporation and the returns are taxed at the lower corporate tax rate. See generally
Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After
1982, 38 TAX L. Rav. 565 (1983) (illustrating the implications of the time value of money).
45. Compare I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (West 1989) (dividends) with id. § 61(a)(3) (gains derived from
dealings in property). The amount of income derived from a sale of stock is quantified by offsetting
the consideration received by the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the stock. Id. § 1001. The gain on a
sale of stock generally includes undistributed corporate earnings because those earnings add to the
value of corporate stock. See C. McLURE, supra note 5, at 20 n.3. But see Bradford, The Incidence
and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB, EcON. 1, 3 (1981) (claiming
that each dollar of retained earnings increases the value of equity by one dollar minus the individual
tax rate).
Under certain circumstances, conversion facilitates a reduction in income by virtue of the op-
portunity to offset potential income by basis. The most obvious instance is when stock is held until
death at which time the decedent's successor takes a fair-market-value basis in the decedent's stock.
I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1989).
46. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF
1986, at 178 (1987) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 AcT]. Although the same
rates applied to both capital gains and other income, only 40%-50% of long-term capital gain were
included in taxable income by virtue of a capital gain deduction allowed to individuals. Id.
47. Indeed, corporate-source income often was burdened less heavily than other sources of in-
come during this period, causing some to view the double taxation of corporate income as a shelter
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D. Double Taxation Emerged (1987-Present)
The structural attributes that minimized the potential burdens of double
taxation for half a century were modified dramatically by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 ("1986 Act").4 8 The 1986 Act significantly increased the burdens imposed
by each of the two taxes that apply to corporate-source income. As a result,
double taxation currently causes corporate income to bear a much greater tax
burden than income from other sources.
The 1986 Act was the product of a melding of two very different interest
groups. One group was sympathetic to the arguments of liberal reformers that a
tax code ridden with loopholes was inequitable and inefficient. 49 The other
group was sympathetic to the conservative advocates of supply side economics
who argued that economic growth would be served by dramatically reducing tax
rates. The two groups came together to produce legislation that was intended to
raise the same amount of revenue as prior law.50 In addition, although an objec-
tive of the new legislation was to redistribute tax burdens among individuals
within each income class in a more fair manner, it was not intended to change
the relative distribution of the total tax burden among income classes. 51
As a general matter, the rate-reduction and base-broadening strategy of the
1986 Act furthered equity and efficiency. 52 The 1986 Act eliminated a myriad
of individual tax preferences that had crept into the law53 and reduced the maxi-
mum individual tax rate to a seventy-year low of twenty-eight percent. 54 In
rather than a burden. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON TAXATION AND NEW
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: A REPORT ON THE
INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUBCHAPTER C 135 (1988) [hereinafter ABA & NYSBA].
48. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 601-47, 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2249-94,
2320.
49. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCi GULCH XV (1987).
50. In other words, the new law was intended to be "revenue neutral." J. BIRNBAUM & A.
MURRAY, supra note 49, at 59; THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND
SIMPLICITY 8 (1985) [hereinafter TREASURY II].
51. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 289 ("[The 1986 Act] made no funda-
mental changes in the distribution of the tax burden among income groups."); TREASURY II, supra
note 50, at 8 ("The President's proposals would result in roughly the same percentage of total reve-.
nues contributed by each income class as under current law-except for the poor who would pay a
much smaller percentage."). The 1986 Act, however, did shift $120 billion of the tax burden from
individuals to corporations. J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 288.
52. See generally J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 288-89 ("In the long run, few
experts doubted that lower tax rates would improve the efficiency of the economy and boost the
chances for economic growth.... Reform narrowed the enormous inequities that permeated the
existing system.... It did make it more likely that individuals and corporations with similar in-
comes would pay similar taxes."); Yorio, supra note 21, at 438-40 (delineating gains in equity and
efficiency).
53. From 1974 to 1986, tax preferences increased from 50% of total tax revenues to more than
100% of total tax revenues. Leonard, Perspectives on the Tax Legislature Process, 38 TAX NOTES
969, 971 (1988). The 1986 Act reduced the level of tax preferences in 1988 by $193 billion. Tax
Reform Act Reduced Tax Expenditures by $193 Billion, Say Treasury Analysts, 43 TAX NOTES 169
(1989); see Yorio, supra note 21, at 430-32 (delineating deductions, credits, and exclusions that were
curtailed by the 1986 Act).
54. See I.R.C. § I (West 1989). Although not expressly stated in the statute, a marginal tax
rate of 33% applies to individual income ranging from approximately $70,000 to $200,000 in the
case of married individuals filing a joint return. See id. § 1(g). The purpose of this provision is to
phase out the benefits derived from the 15% rate that applies approximately to the first $30,000 of
income and the exemptions allowed for individuals and their dependents. Its effect is to increase the
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addition, the corporate tax base was expanded dramatically 5s and the corporate
tax rate was reduced to thirty-four percent (six percentage points higher than
the maximum individual rate).56 Although the legislative history to the 1986
Act reveals some concern about setting a corporate rate below the individual tax
rate,57 little, if any, attention was directed at the implications of the converse, a
corporate rate higher than the individual rate.
By continuing to view the corporate tax and the individual income tax as
discrete taxes, Congress inadvertently increased the relative tax burden on cor-
porate-source income to almost twice the burden imposed on other income.5 8
The first tax on corporate-source income no longer can be dismissed as insignifi-
cant by virtue of the expanded corporate tax base and the revised rate struc-
ture.59 Indeed, now that the maximum corporate rate exceeds the maximum
individual rate, the first tax alone on corporate income often will be greater than
the single tax imposed on income from other sources.
The burden imposed by the second tax on corporate income also increased
dramatically as a result of the rate structure that emerged from the 1986 Act.
Although the second tax on corporate income still is deferred until corporate
earnings are distributed, 60 the ability to utilize the deferral feature to reduce the
magnitude of the second tax has been curtailed substantially. Deferral of the
second tax no longer confers an economic benefit in present value terms because
the corporate tax rate now generally exceeds the individual tax rate.61 In addi-
average tax rate to 28% with respect to those individuals with ipcomes above approximately
$200,000.
55. See Yorio, supra note 21, at 434-35 (explaining that exclusions, credits, and deductions
were curtailed, while alternative minimum tax was expanded). The base broadening resulted in a
corporate tax increase of roughly $120 billion, the largest corporate tax increase in history. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 884 (1986). In effect, however, these changes simply
restored the corporate tax to its pre-1981 level. See Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Inte-
gration, 35 TAX NOTES 889, 893 (1987).
56. The first $50,000 of corporate income is taxed at 15% and the next $25,000 is taxed at 25%.
Corporate income ranging from $100,000 to $335,000 is taxed at a marginal rate of 39% to eliminate
the benefit derived from the lower rates on the first $75,000. I.R.C. § ll(b)(1) (West 1989). The
39% corporate rate is analogous to the 33% marginal rate that applies to a limited range of individ-
ual income. See supra note 54.
57. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 59; Minarik, supra note 42, at 1367-68
("[Treasury] lowered the corporate rate to two percentage points below the top individual rate, but
hesitated to go further because of a possible inducement to incorporate hitherto unincorporated
businesses to cut taxes with the lower corporate rate.").
58. See supra note 4; see also Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A
State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C.L. REV. 839, 875 (1988) ("Clearly, Congress did not grasp the po-
tential consequences of the 1986 and 1987 Acts on the taxation of corporations and their sharehold-
ers, nor did it intend these results."). Although the original proposals from which the 1986 Act
emerged provided limited relief from double taxation for dividend income, the prospect of such relief
was dismissed early in the legislative process largely because of the revenue loss that would have
resulted from such relief. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 87; Minarik, supra
note 42, at 1365.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
60. See supra text accompanying note 43.
61. When corporate income is taxed at a rate in excess of the individual tax rate, it becomes
more costly to defer the second tax than to incur the second tax immediately. For example, assume
that the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate in the example set forth, supra note 44, are
reversed; in other words, that the corporate tax rate is 50% and that the individual tax rate is 30%.
If the corporation invests the $1,000, it would earn $100 on which it would pay a tax of $50. If the
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tion, the 1986 Act repealed the individual capital gains deduction as part of its
base-broadening strategy. 62 Consequently, the second tax on corporate income
generally will not be reduced by converting potential dividend income to capital
gains. 63 For the first time in history, therefore, the double taxation of corporate
income often causes such income to bear a tax burden substantially greater than
the single tax imposed on income from other sources. 64
E. Desire to Reduce Double Taxation Must Be Reconciled
With Revenue Need
The overtaxation of distributed corporate income is likely to command at-
tention in the near future. For instance, the 1986 Act explicitly instructed the
Treasury to prepare a study of the corporate tax provisions.65 That study is
likely to address the magnitude of double taxation after tax reform. In addition,
congressional hearings conducted in 1989 considered integration as a possible
corporation then paid a dividend of the $1,050 that remained, the individual shareholder would pay
a tax of $315 on the dividend. Thus, the shareholder would net $735 after all taxes were paid. By
contrast, if the corporation paid a dividend of the $1,000 rather than investing it, the shareholder
would pay a tax of $300 and have $700 to invest. When the shareholder invests the $700, the
shareholder would earn $70 on which the shareholder would pay a tax of $21. Thus, the shareholder
would net $749 after all taxes were paid. Because the corporate tax rate exceeds the individual tax
rate, total tax liabilities are reduced when the earnings are distributed and the subsequent returns are
taxed at the lower individual tax rate.
62. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 2216.
63. Capital gain treatment still will be desired by those taxpayers with capital losses. See I.R.C.
§ 1211(b) (West 1989). Moreover, converting potential dividend income to gain from the sale of
property will be beneficial to those taxpayers whose stock basis includes part of the earnings attribu-
table to such stock. See, eg., id. § 1014.
Congress considered restoring preferential treatment to capital gain income in 1989. See Reve-
nue Reconciliation Bill of 1989, H.R. 3299, §§ 11951-11953 (passed by House of Representatives
Oct. 5, 1989) (providing for reduction in capital gains tax for noncorporate taxpayers); Taxwriters
Moving Slowly But Surely on Capital Gains, 44 TAX NOTES 623, 623 (1989). The legislation that
ultimately was enacted did not address capital gains. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-239, - Stat. -.
64. An alternative view is that corporate income still is not overtaxed relative to other sources
of income. See Leduc & Gordon, Two Visions of Subchapter C. Understanding the 1986 Reform Act
and the 1987 Revenue Act and Predicting the Near Future, 46 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 37-1 (1988). From
this perspective, the corporate tax is minimized by virtue of the ability of corporate taxpayers to
gravitate to the noncorporate sector and to eradicate the corporate tax base through excessive debt
financing. Id. at 37-9 to 37-12. For a discussion of the extent to which these factors indict double
taxation, see infra text accompanying notes 177-89. This alternative view also highlights that the
shareholder level tax is reduced in certain cases. See I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1989) (step up in basis of
appreciated corporate stock at death of shareholder occurs without imposition of any tax on gain
attributable to undistributed corporate income); CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note
16, at 14 (32.2% of corporate equity owned by private pension funds, state and local government
retirement plans, charitable organizations, foundations, and private trusts not subject to shareholder
level tax); Leduc & Gordon, supra, at 37-14 to 37-16 (corporations increasingly have avoided or
limited second-level taxes on individuals by substituting stock redemption plans for ordinary divi-
dend distributions).
65. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 634, 100 Stat. 2282. It is anticipated that
the Treasury study will focus on debt/equity issues and choice of entity issues, both of which are
believed to indict double taxation. Matthews & Moriarty, Subchapter C Study on Hold Until Treas-
ury Tax Vacancy Filled, 42 TAx NOTES 1426, 1426 (1989); see infra text accompanying notes 157-
69. The House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures also is studying whether modifications
should be made to the corporate tax provisions. Rostenkowski Announces Select Revenue Measures
Subcommittee Agenda, 42 TAx NOTES 1014, 1014 (1989).
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response to the problems posed by the excessive utilization of debt financing.66
Most recently, Treasury officials have been arguing in favor of integration. 67
Before interest in relieving the overtaxation of corporate income gathers mo-
mentum, 68 it is critical to consider the revenue implications of eliminating
double taxation.
It is widely accepted that the elimination of double taxation would entail a
significant loss of revenue.69 The revenue implications of tax reform have taken
on increased significance in recent years. Prior to the current decade, taxing and
spending decisions were not formally connected to one another. Since 1980,
however, a reconciliation process has been implemented which mandates that
tax legislation accommodate the priorities of the budget.70 The enactment of the
revised Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute in 1987 strengthened the reconcilia-
tion process by mandating automatic spending cuts unless the budget deficit falls
below predetermined levels.7 1 Congress now faces immense pressure to raise
revenue in light of the budget goals established by the revised Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings statute.72 As a result, a proposal involving a significant loss of revenue,
such as integration, can be expected to be accompanied by a tax increase to
compensate for the revenue loss. 73
66. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 82-103.
67. See Brady Offers Sermon on Capital Gains Cut and Corporate Integration to the Converted,
supra note 15, at 1311 (reporting that Treasury Secretary endorsed working toward the goal of tax
integration in Sept. 12, 1989 speech to American Business Conference); Still Out ofthe Loop: Treas-
ury Miffed Over Bentsen's FaitAccompli, 45 TAX NOTES 139, 140 (1989) (reporting Assistant Treas-
ury Secretary Gideon's statements that double taxation places United States business at a
competitive disadvantage and that Treasury is beginning a study on integration).
68. Popular support for integration may remain limited. The public generally favors the corpo-
rate tax because of the perception that it only burdens big business. See Leonard, supra nbte 55, at
895; Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAX
NOTES 637, 646 (1985). Corporate management historically has been opposed to any relief mecha-
nism that might create additional pressures to pay dividends rather than to utilize accumulations in
the business. Leonard, supra note 55, at 895; Minarik, supra note 42, at 1367; Sheppard, supra, at
645. The limited number of legislative efforts in recent years to minimize the burden of double
taxation have been dismal failures. See Leonard, supra note 55, at 894.
69. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 399; Leonard, supra note 55, at 894-
95; supra note 15.
70. A 1980 budget resolution instructed the tax writing committees to increase revenues by $4.2
billion in fiscal 1981. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1051, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). For a discussion of
history of the reconciliation process, see Leonard, supra note 53, at 973.
71. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987); see Leonard, supra note 53, at 974.
72. See Administration Continues Retreat from 'No-New-Taxes' Pledge, 43 TAx NOTES 1063
(1989); Minarik, supra note 42, at 1372; Tax Writers Moving Slowly But Surely on Capital Gains,
supra note 63, at 624-25 (quoting following language of letter to colleagues from nine members of
Ways and Means Committee: "Our continuing massive budget deficit will require us to raise sub-
stantial revenues, probably as soon as next year.").
73. See, e.g., Steuerle, Fair Budget Policy, Bad Tax Policy, 44 TAx NOTES 455, 455 (1989)
(stating that since 1986 Act, "Congress has operated under a set of rules that typically require in-
creased revenue to accompany expenditure increases"); Bentsen to Treasury: Take a (Useful) Stand
on Section 89, 43 TAX NOTES 779, 779 (1989) (reporting that Senate Finance Committee Chairman
castigated Treasury for failing to recommend ways of offsetting revenue loss from changes Treasury
supports to I.R.C. § 89); Rostenkowski Sets Ground Rulesfor Members'Amendments to Tax Bill, 44
TAX NOTES 1063, 1063 (1989) (paraphrasing House Ways and Means Committee Chairman's state-
ment to committee members that no amendments to 1989 Tax Bill "will be entertained that lose
revenue and are not accompanied by an offsetting revenue-raising proposal").
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The legal literature generally has not accorded significant attention to the
revenue implications of double taxation. Indeed, critics of double taxation argue
that revenue need can justify any method of taxation regardless of how odious
its effect might be. 74 The real question, however, is whether the effect of double
taxation is objectionable relative to the effect of an alternative method of raising
revenue.
To evaluate the case against double taxation, the remainder of this Article
will articulate and critique the two perspectives from which double taxation his-
torically has been condemned. The tendency to appraise the impact of double
taxation solely upon the goals of equity and efficiency, without consideration of a
revenue constraint, has distracted attention from the possibility that double tax-
ation may extract revenue in a more desirable manner than an alternative reve-
nue source.
III. CASE AGAINST DOUBLE TAXATION ON EQUITABLE GROUNDS
The equitable principle that individuals with equal incomes should bear
equal tax burdens appears inconsistent with any corporate tax, let alone double
taxation of corporate income. It is only because the individual income tax fails
to reach undistributed corporate income that the corporate tax is accepted as a
second-best approach to achieving equity. The double taxation of distributed
corporate income is regarded as an undesirable by-product of this second-best
approach. Those who accept the corporate tax as a mechanism for correcting
the undertaxation of undistributed corporate income favor integration as a
means for eliminating the overtaxation of distributed corporate income.
A. Undertaxation of Undistributed Income Is Root of Equitable Perspective
The income tax laws of the United States reflect the philosophy that gov-
ernment expenditures are to be financed based on the ability of the individual
members of society to pay.75 Income is the index on which ability to pay is
gauged in the United States.76 The fairness criterion that emerges from a system
in which income measures ability to pay is that all individuals with equal in-
74. See, e.g., Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Prob-
lem in Economics, 1965 WIs. L. REV. 576, 578-79 ("Similarly disturbing is the opinion offered by
some experts.., that the corporate tax can be defended on the ground that it is a good source of
revenue-a view that ... apparently is based upon some well concealed antidemocratic value
judgments.").
75. Two primary philosophies exist as to how societal wants and needs should be matched with
tax revenues. Under a "benefits approach," taxation is related to the benefits received from public
expenditures. Under an "ability-to-pay approach," contributions for public expenditures are based
on an individual's resources rather than benefits derived. The United States has adopted an ability-
to-pay approach. See R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 61-115.
76. Income and consumption are both valid indices of equality. See id. at 161-64. Much disa-
greement exists about which index is preferable to utilize for taxing purposes. See Andrews, A Con-
sumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Warren, Fairness
and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); An-
drews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARv. L. REV. 947
(1975); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081
(1980).
1990]
NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
comes should be taxed alike, irrespective of the sources from which their in-
comes are derived. 77 The manner in which income is defined is of critical
importance in assessing the equitable implications of an income tax.
Although income often is conceptualized in terms of payments received, the
concept of income on which United States tax law is based looks to actual and
potential purchasing power.78  The Haig-Simons economic definition of in-
come79 is the ideal to which the income tax base is compared. According to the
Haig-Simons definition, income is the sum of consumption and the increase in
net wealth between two points in time.80
The Haig-Simons income definition is somewhat broader than the definition
utilized by the United States tax law. Most significantly, existing law departs
from the Haig-Simons principle that asset appreciation is income when it oc-
curs. 8' Instead, the tax law generally requires a sale or other disposition ("reali-
zation") before asset appreciation is included in the individual income tax
base.82 Thus, under United States law, an individual does not pay tax on asset
appreciation until the individual sells the appreciated property.
The realization requirement operates to insulate owners of corporate stock
from more than conventional asset appreciation. Because the tax law treats cor-
porations as entities separate from their owners, 83 accumulated operating in-
77. The principle of horizontal equity, that taxpayers in similar positions should be treated
equally, is "perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation." R. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 6, at 160.
78. See D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 15 (1986) (contrasting "factor pay-
ment" view that income is what is received with "uses" view that income is to be measured by the
sum of consumption and additions to wealth, the latter view being generally accepted as the basis for
taxation in the United States).
79. R. HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1921); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 50 (1938).
80. A more complete definition is as follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and the end of the period in question. In other words, it is merely
the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the
period and then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain,
as our courts have recognized in their more lucid moments-and gain to someone during a
specified time interval. Moreover, this gain may be measured and defined most easily by
positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of which may be
estimated in a common unit by appeal to market prices.
H. SIMONS, supra note 79, at 50.
Economists question the value of the Haig-Simons tax base in comparing tax burdens of differ-
ent individuals due to differences in tastes and abilities among individuals. See Atkinson & Stiglitz,
The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 55, 70-73 (1976);
Feldstein, supra note 13, at 82-83, 87-89.
81. See H. SIMONS, supra note 79, at 99-100 ("Strictly speaking, the calculation of income
demands complete reevaluation of all assets and obligations at the end of every period.").
82. A "realization event"-a sale or other disposition-must occur before asset appreciation is
reflected in income. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001 (West 1989). For an exception to this rule in the ease
of certain options and futures contracts, see id. § 1256. For a recent proposal to curtail substantially
the realization requirement, see Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Tax-
ation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986). For more specific proposals to curtail realization with re-
spect to publicly traded corporate stock, see ABA & NYSBA, supra note 47, at 73; Slawson, Taxing
as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Thuronyi, The
Taxation of Corporate Income-Proposalfor Reform, 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 109 (1983).
83. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1989). But see id. §§ 1361-1378 (an S Corporation is treated in many
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come simply adds to the value of each shareholder's stock.8 4 Accumulated
corporate income is not included in the individual tax base until the individual
shareholders either receive dividends8 5 or sell their stock.8 6 Thus, in addition to
conventional asset appreciation, operating income generated by a corporation
will be shielded from the individual income tax by the realization requirement.
The omission of corporate operating income from the individual income tax
is a source of inequity even in a tax system that imposes a realization require-
ment. Short of eliminating the realization requirement,87 the most direct way of
remedying this inequity would be to allocate undistributed corporate income
proportionately among the individual shareholders, with each shareholder in-
cluding a portion of such income on his individual tax return.8 8 Needless to say,
if an allocation approach were adopted, the equitable ideal that all individuals
with equal incomes bear equal tax burdens would not be furthered by imposing a
separate tax on corporations.8 9 Because of its burdensome nature, however, the
allocation approach is not considered to be a viable option.90 Thus, unless a tax
that simulates the burdens of the individual income tax is imposed on undistrib-
uted corporate income, the equitable goal of causing all individuals with equal
incomes to bear equivalent tax burdens will be violated.
B. Corporate Tax Is Second-Best Solution to Undertaxation
of Undistributed Income
In the absence of a corporate tax, the ability to defer the taxation of undis-
tributed corporate income until dividends are paid would cause undistributed
corporate income to bear a lesser burden than other forms of income.91 Conse-
respects as a conduit). For an insightful commentary on the arbitrary manner in which the entity/
conduit distinction is made under United States tax law, see Klein, Income Taxation and Legal
Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 13 (1972).
84. See supra note 45.
85. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (Vest 1989).
86. Id. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001.
87. Taxing undistributed corporate income to shareholders is less extreme than eliminating the
realization requirement in its entirety. See J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE U.S.
CORPORATION INCOME TAX 7 (1980) ("While there are good reasons for taxing capital gains only
when they have been realized ... these reasons do not apply to [corporate] retentions."); Warren,
supra note 5, at 741 n.65 ("[Tihe abandonment of the realization criterion ... would go a step
beyond allocation, which retains the realization concept in taxing shareholders only on income real-
ized by the corporation.").
88. The Treasury Department published a model for allocating undistributed corporate income
to shareholders and utilizing the corporate tax as no more than a withholding device. U.S. TREAS-
URY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM 68-75 (1977); see supra note 11 (distinguishing
allocation from integration).
89. The earliest tax laws of the United States caused corporate income to be allocated to share-
holders and imposed no discrete corporate tax. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
90. See, e.g., ABA & NYSBA, supra note 47, at 132-33; C. MCLURE, supra note 5, at 35-36.
Some analysts do favor allocation. See, eg., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C. An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 153-61 (1977) (advocating allocation of undistrib-
uted earnings to shareholders); McLure, supra note 5, at 581; see also Warren, supra note 5, at 740
(implying that allocation might be desirable at some future time).
91. Even if the individual income tax is imposed in the future at the same rate that would apply
to a current dividend, the shareholders will derive an economic benefit from being able to invest the
deferred income without incurring a tax on the returns generated by such income. Consequently, it
is not the deferral of the individual income tax that would lead to undertaxation, but rather, that the
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quently, a corporate tax on undistributed corporate income can be justified from
an equitable perspective to the extent that it simulates the individual income tax
that would be imposed if dividends were paid immediately. 92 Thus, a corporate
tax intended to remedy the undertaxation of undistributed corporate income
should mirror the individual income tax. Specifically, the corporate tax would
be imposed on a broad base and at the individual income tax rate that would
apply if dividends were paid immediately.
The tax structure that emerged from the 1986 Act can be reconciled with
the goal of designing a corporate tax to resemble the individual income tax. The
1986 Act dramatically broadened the corporate tax base. 93 Furthermore, it re-
duced the number of marginal individual tax rates from fourteen to two,94
thereby eliminating much of the variability that previously existed with respect
to the individual tax rate that would apply if corporate income were distributed
as dividends. Moreover, the individual rate structure is designed in a manner
that causes all but the lowest income individuals to be taxed at a rate of twenty-
eight percent. 95 Rather than setting the corporate tax rate at twenty-eight per-
returns generated by the deferred tax are not subjected to tax during the deferral period, See supra
notes 44 & 61.
92. See R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 173-75. The extent to which a corporate tax imposed
on undistributed corporate income furthers equity is questionable. A corporate tax imposed on un-
distributed corporate income may cause such income to bear the same burden as other forms of
income. The equitable ideal, however, focuses on the burdens borne by people, not the burdens
borne by income. Thus, the belief that a corporate tax potentially can serve as a substitute for
subjecting undistributed corporate income to the individual income tax implicitly assumes that the
burdens of the corporate tax fall on the shareholders. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 8, at 386-87. Compare Warren, supra note 5, at 731 n.37 (develops case for integration assum-
ing profit-maximizing behavior) with J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 16 (assumption of maximiza-
tion of profits is inconsistent with shifting).
The extent to which the burdens imposed by the corporate tax are borne by shareholders is
unclear. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 22, at 141-46; Goode, Who Bears the Corporation Income
Tax?, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 410, 410 (1965). It is possible that part or all of the corporate tax is borne
by all owners of capital by virtue of equilibrating forces in the economy. See Harberger, The Inci-
dence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962). For an analysis of the efficiency
implications of this phenomenon, see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. Part or all of the
corporate tax may be shifted to labor through reduced wages, see J. PECHMAN, supra note 22, at 144,
or to consumers through increased prices, see M. KRZYZANIANK & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING
OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 2 (1963). For a critical analysis of the view that the corporate
tax can be shifted away from the owners of capital, see Goode, supra, at 410. The incidence of the
corporate tax is unknown and many believe that the answer never will be found. See Klein, supra
note 74, at 601 ("[I]t is reasonably clear that for the present and the foreseeable future the question
of who pays the corporation income tax remains wholly unanswerable, and that this rules out diffi-
dent assertions of probabilities as much as it does bold assertions of certainties."); see also C, SHOUP,
PUBLIc FINANCE 11-19 (1969) (arguing that incidence is invalid concept since effect of tax cannot be
isolated where one does not know what distributional consequences would be in absence of tax);
Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy?, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 780, 798 (1974) (querying why the
incidence of individual income tax is assumed in light of great uncertainty about incidence of corpo.
rate tax).
93. See supra note 55.
94. Although the rate tables reveal marginal individual rates of 15% and 28%, a limited range
of individual income does bear a marginal rate of 33% by virtue of the phaseout of the 15% rate and
the personal exemptions. I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1989); see supra note 54.
95. Married individuals filing a joint return with income in excess of $29,750 (as adjusted for
inflation) pay tax at a marginal rate of 28%. I.R.C. § l(a) (West 1989). The limited range of indi-
vidual income that is taxed at a marginal rate of 33% is intended to eliminate the benefit of the 15%
rate and personal exemptions thereby causing such individuals with income in that range to ap-
proach an average tax rate of 28%. See supra note 54.
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cent, however, the 1986 Act established an even higher corporate tax rate of
thirty-four percent. 96 The prevailing view, therefore, is that undistributed cor-
porate income no longer is undertaxed.
97
A corporate tax that simulates the individual income tax is believed to fur-
ther the equitable ideal with respect to undistributed corporate income. The
imposition of a corporate tax on distributed corporate income, however, causes
such income to bear a burden greater than the burden imposed on income from
other sources.
C. Double Taxation Is Undesirable By-Product of Corporate Tax
One might expect that distributed corporate income would bear twice the
tax burden of other forms of income if it were subjected to a corporate tax that
resembles the individual income tax as well the individual income tax itself.
Corporate income used to pay the corporate tax, however, is not subject to the
individual income tax.98 Consequently, literal "double" taxation will not occur
when distributed corporate income is subjected to two similar taxes.
Because the individual income tax is not imposed on corporate income ab-
sorbed by the corporate tax, the overtaxation of distributed corporate income
relative to other income rises as a uniform corporate and individual tax rate falls.
For example, if both the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate were fifty
percent, distributed corporate income would bear one hundred fifty percent of
the burden of other forms of income. If, however, the tax rate were ten percent,
distributed corporate income would bear one hundred ninety percent of the bur-
96. I.R.C. § I (b) (West 1989). Although lower marginal rates continue to apply to threshold
amounts of corporate income, the scope of the lower marginal rates has been dramatically reduced in
recent years. See id. § 11(b). A limited range of corporate income is taxed at a marginal rate of 39%
to eliminate the benefit of the lower marginal rates. Id. § I l(b)(1); see supra note 56.
97. The view that undistributed corporate income is no longer undertaxed emerges from the
analysis that the current rate structure no longer provides an incentive to accumulate corporate
earnings to defer the individual income tax and, in fact, that the higher corporate rate may create a
disincentive to accumulate. See Warren, supra note 5, at 724 (finds small incentive to accumulate
even when rates equalized because he assumes distributed earnings will be reinvested in the corpora-
tion); Zolt, supra note 58, at 866-68 (assumes distributed earnings will not be reinvested in corpora-
tion); supra note 61.
98. Distributed corporate income would bear twice the burden of other sources of income only
if the corporate tax paid with respect to dividends were added to the base on which the individual
income tax was imposed. For example, if both the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate
were 20%, a $20 corporate tax would be imposed on $100 of corporate income but only a $16
individual income tax would be imposed when the earnings net of the corporate tax were distributed
as a dividend ($80 x 20% = $16). If, however, the shareholder were required to include in gross
income the $20 corporate tax paid with respect to the earnings that generated the dividend as well as
the $80 dividend, a $20 individual income tax would be imposed. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 78 (West 1989)
(domestic corporation must include in gross income amount equal to deemed paid foreign taxes to
claim a credit against United States tax liability for those foreign taxes). It would not be sensible to
cause shareholders to include the corporate tax in gross income where no credit against individual
tax liability is allowed for the corporate tax.
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den of other income.99 This analysis suggests that efforts to expand the individ-
ual and corporate tax bases and to reduce tax rates as low as possible inevitably
will worsen the overtaxation of distributed corporate income. This relative rate
perspective makes the overtaxation of distributed corporate income appear to be
a more pressing problem in the face of the policy goals expressed by the recent
tax reform effort. 100
The relationship between tax rates and the overtaxation of distributed cor-
porate income differs dramatically, however, when one analyzes the burdens in
absolute terms. Whereas the relative overtaxation of distributed corporate in-
come increases as the tax rate falls, absolute overtaxation decreases as the tax
rate falls below fifty percent. For example, if both the corporate tax rate and the
individual tax rate were fifty percent, the difference between the tax burden on
distributed corporate income and the burden on other income would be twenty-
five percent. By contrast, if the tax rate were ten percent, the difference in tax
burdens would be only nine percent.'01 When one focuses on the overtaxation
of distributed income in absolute terms, it becomes possible to reconcile the goal
of Minimizing the overtaxation of distributed corporate income with goals of
base broadening and rate reduction manifested by the recent tax reform effort,
Specifically, as tax rates are reduced, the overtaxation of distributed corporate
income also will be curtailed in absolute terms.
Regardless of how low tax rates are set, however, distributed corporate in-
come that is subject to both the corporate tax and the individual income tax will
99.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uniform Burden on Relative Absolute
Tax Rate Dividends Burden Burden
t t+t(1-t) (2)/(1) (2)-(1)
90% 99% 110% 9%
80% 96% 120% 16%
70% 91% 130% 21%
60% 84% 140% 24%
50% 75% 150% 25%
40% 64% 160% 24%
30% 51% 170% 21%
20% 36% 180% 16%
10% 19% 190% 9%
100. Under existing law, distributed corporate income may bear as much as 187% of the burden
of other forms of income. See supra note 4 (524,800 / 280,000 = 1.874). The burden on corporate-
source income is much greater than might be expected because the maximum corporate tax rate
exceeds the maximum individual tax rate. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (b)(l) (West 1989).
Relative overtaxation is higher in the case of those individuals who pay tax at a marginal rate of
less than the mtiximum marginal rate. See McLure, supra note 5, at 535-36. Because the 1986 Act
dramatically reduced the number of marginal tax rates and the range between the highest and lowest
rates, this observation is of less significance now than under prior law. See infra text accompanying
notes 120-27.
101. See supra note 99 (Col. 4). Under existing law the difference between the tax burden on
distributed corporate income and the tax burden on other forms of income is approximately 24.5%
(52.48%-28%=24.5%). See supra note 4.
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bear a burden in excess of the tax burden imposed on other sources of income. 102
This additional burden appears inconsistent with the equitable ideal that all indi-
viduals with equal incomes should bear equivalent tax burdens. 10 3 Conse-
quently, many commentators argue that the remedy for double taxation from an
equitable perspective is to eliminate the corporate tax on distributed corporate
income by adopting integration. 1°4
The equitable perspective on double taxation, therefore, focuses on the
overtaxation that results from applying the corporate tax, in addition to the
individual income tax, to distributed corporate income. Integration is regarded
as desirable from an equitable perspective because it would eliminate the relative
overtaxation of distributed corporate income by eliminating the burden of the
corporate tax on distributed corporate income.' 05
IV. CRITIQUE OF EQUITABLE PERSPECTIVE
The equitable argument against double taxation of corporate income is
problematic because it fails to acknowledge adequately the interest of society in
causing affluent individuals to bear relatively greater tax burdens than less afflu-
ent individuals. More of the burdens resulting from the double taxation of cor-
porate income appear to be borne by the rich than the poor. Attempting to
maintain this allocation of tax burdens by substituting higher individual tax
rates for double taxation may cause the tax system to move further from the goal
of causing all similarly situated individuals to bear equivalent tax burdens.
A. Double Taxation Furthers Progressivity When Tax Rates Are Low
Double taxation appears inconsistent with horizontal equity, the principle
that all similarly situated individuals should bear the same tax burden irrespec-
tive of the sources of their incomes. 106 Although ownership of corporate stock
102. See supra note 99.
103. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 11 (defining integration). Various methods of integration have been pro-
posed. One approach is to allow the corporation a deduction for dividends paid. See ABA &
NYSBA, supra note 47, at 134; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 151-52;
McLure, supra note 5, at 554-55; Warren, supra note 5, at 774. A similar approach is to utilize a
"split-rate" whereby the corporation would be taxed at a higher rate on undistributed earnings than
on distributed earnings. See ABA & NYSBA, supra note 47, at 134; Warren, supra note 5, at 775.
Alternatively, shareholders might be required to include both dividends and the corporate tax paid
with respect to the dividends in income and be allowed a credit for the corporate tax against their
individual tax liabilities. See ABA & NYSBA, supra note 47, at 133-34; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 42, at 153; McLure, supra note 5, at 553-54; Warren, supra note 5, at 773-74.
Proposals also have been made to eliminate the individual income tax on distributed corporate in-
come by excluding dividends from the individual tax base. See Bravenec, supra note 10, at 1381;
McLure, supra note 5, at 552-53; Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating the Double Taxation of Corporate
Dividends, 39 TAx LAw 1 (1985); Steuerle, supra note 10, at 335; Jacobs, The Disincorporation of
America: A Prospective Historical Perspective (unpublished paper presented to New York City Tax
Club Apr. 15, 1987) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
105. This Article focuses on the cost of integration in terms of forgone revenue and does not
address the many technical problems associated with integration. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 42, at 154-60; Warren, supra note 5, at 772-94.
106. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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is concentrated in the hands of high-income individuals, 10 7 all high-income indi-
viduals do not derive the same percentage of their incomes from dividends. Sim-
ilarly, although individuals with lower incomes derive some dividend income, 10 8
it is unlikely that all individuals at any given income level derive the same per-
centage of their incomes from dividends. Consequently, the double taxation of
corporate income probably does cause similarly situated individuals to bear
somewhat different tax burdens. 109
In spite of its impact on horizontal equity, double taxation does further a
second dimension of equity: namely, vertical equity. Vertical equity is the prin-
ciple that an individual's tax burden should increase as that individual's ability
to pay increases. 110 Where ability to pay is measured by income, vertical equity
can be furthered simply by causing an individual's tax burden to increase at a
steady rate as income increases. For example, a tax system in which individuals
with ten dollars of income pay one dollar of tax and individuals with one hun-
dred dollars of income pay ten dollars of tax would be consistent with vertical
equity, notwithstanding that both groups of individuals pay taxes equal to ten
percent of their incomes. By contrast, a tax system in which an individual's tax
burden rises at an increasing rate as income increases also is consistent with
vertical equity. For example, a tax system in which individuals with ten dollars
of income pay one dollar of tax and individuals with one hundred dollars of
income pay twenty dollars of tax also would be consistent with vertical equity.
A tax system in which an individual's tax burden increases at an increasing
rate as income rises is progressive.I' The United States generally has regarded
progressivity as desirable.1 2 Empirical studies demonstrate that the double tax-
ation of corporate income adds to the progressivity of the United States tax sys-
tem. 1'3 The progressive nature of double taxation is attributable to the fact that
107. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 57 ("high tax rate taxpayers
will tend to concentrate their wealth in the form of equity"). An indication of the extent to which
equity ownership is concentrated among high-income shareholders can be determined from the dis-
tribution of dividend income among income classes. In 1984, 73.8% of total dividend income re-
ported by all individuals was reported by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $30,000.
STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RE-
TURNS 1984: RETURNS FILED, SOURCES OF INCOME, EXEMPTIONS, ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS, AND
TAX COMPUTATIONS 18 (1986) [hereinafter STATISTICS OF INCOME] (percentage derived from data
in Table 1.4).
108. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 107, at 18.
109. It may be that part or all of the burden of the corporate tax is shifted away from sharehold-
ers to other individuals. See supra note 92. The shifting process may eliminate much of the horizon-
tal inequity associated with the corporate tax. See Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax
Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979).
110. R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 160.
111. See D. BRADFORD, supra note 78, at 152. Care should be taken not to associate progressiv-
ity only with higher marginal tax rates. For example, the 1986 Act reduced differences in marginal
tax rates dramatically but at the Same time sustained the relative tax burdens borne by each income
class other than the lowest. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
112. The question of how progressive the income tax should be is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The Article assumes simply that the degree of progressivity achieved by the existing tax laws
reflects the desires of society. See supra note 17.
113. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-85, 80 (1985). Dr. Pechman's study
establishes the following with respect to the effective rate of corporate tax (corporate tax as a per-
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stock ownership tends to be concentrated among high-income individuals.1 14
Consequently, if the corporate tax operates as an indirect tax on shareholders, 1 5
it can be defended on equitable grounds as having a progressive effect. 116
Opponents of double taxation have attempted to undermine its contribution
to progressivity by focusing on the impact of double taxation on dividend recipi-
ents who do not pay tax at the maximum individual rate. 1 7 When lower in-
come individuals pay tax at a lower rate than higher income individuals, double
taxation has a regressive effect: it causes low-income dividend recipients to bear
centage of individual income) borne by individuals at each level of the income scale for the year
1985:
Effective rate of













Id. at 35 (derived from Table 3-1). Pechman derived these results by allocating 50% of the corpo-
rate tax to dividend recipients and 50% to capital income in general. Id. Progressivity is likely to be
even greater if the entire corporate tax were allocated to dividend recipients. See also Feldstein,
Imputing Corporate Tax Liabilities to Individual Taxpayers, 41 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 37-38, 49-51
(1988) (demonstrating progressivity of corporate tax when 100% of corporate tax is allocated to
capital income in general).
Correspondingly, integration is likely to reduce progressivity. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 16, at 328 (Integration "would only be accomplished at a substantial cost in... progres-
sivity, since a high proportion of dividends flow to high income wealthy individuals."); C. MCLURE,
supra note 5, at 29-30 (discusses study indicating that integration would reduce tax burdens at bot-
tom of the income scale by less than 1% and at top of income scale by 3% to 5%); Manvel, Is A
Dividend Tax Credit "Progressive"?, 6 TAX NOTES 391, 391-93 (1978) (demonstrating that the late
Senator Ullman's March 1978 proposal to allow a partial credit against the individual tax for divi-
dends received may have had a regressive effect).
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
115. The equity critique follows the incidence assumption generally made by those arguing for
integration on equitable grounds; namely, that the corporate tax is borne by shareholders. See supra
note 92. The possibility that the corporate tax is borne by individuals other than corporate share-
holders undermines the logic by which those advocating integration can reconcile a corporate tax on
undistributed corporate income with horizontal equity. To the extent that the burden of the corpo-
rate tax is not borne by shareholders, the corporate tax fails to eliminate the inequity that results
from the omission of undistributed corporate income from the individual tax base. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-92.
116. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 56 ("If one assumes that the cor-
porate tax is paid by stockholders,... then the tax appears highly progressive given the concentra-
tion of share ownership in the higher income classes."); R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME
TAX 40 (1951) ("Stock ownership and dividends are an important source of inequality of income and
wealth. A corporation income tax is one means of reducing such inequalities.").
117. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 22, at 179-81; McLure, supra note 5, at 535-36, 539.
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a relatively greater tax burden than high-income dividend recipients. 118 For ex-
ample, when individual tax rates ranged from fourteen percent to seventy per-
cent, the additional burden that double taxation imposed on individuals subject
to the lowest individual marginal rate was almost three times the additional bur-
den that double taxation imposed on high-income shareholders.' 19
Efforts to undermine the progressivity of double taxation by citing its im-
pact on individual shareholders taxed at less than the maximum marginal rate
have been weakened considerably by the individual rate reductions accom-
plished by tax reform. 120 As the 1986 Act demonstrates, a substantial reduction
in the highest individual tax rate allows for a significantly lower income thresh-
old above which the maximum rate applies. Under existing law, the twenty-
eight percent maximum individual rate applies to the taxable income of a mar-
ried couple in excess of approximately $30,000.121 By contrast, under prior law
the fifty percent maximum individual rate did not apply until a married couple
reported taxable income in excess of $160,000!122 As a result of the 1986 Act,
therefore, far more individual income will be subjected to the maximum margi-
118. McLure, supra note 5, at 539.
119. Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28
NAT'L TAX J. 341, 342 (1975) (assuming that all corporate profits are paid out as dividends, the
additional burden on a 14%-tax-bracket shareholder was 187% greater than the burden on a 70%-
tax-bracket shareholder). The following table (modified from the table in J. PECHMAN, supra note
22, at 180) illustrates the regressive impact of a corporate tax imposed at a flat rate of 48% (the rate
in effect when Break and Pechman conducted their study) and borne entirely by shareholders (when
all earnings are paid out as dividends):
Marginal Additional
individual Corporate Dividends Stockholder Total burden of
income income Corporation received by individual tax corporate
tax rate before tax tax at 48% stockholders income tax burden tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
14% $100 $48 $52 $ 7.28 $55.28 $41.28
20% 100 48 52 10.40 58.40 38.40
30% 100 48 52 15.60 63.60 33.60
50% 100 48 52 26.00 74.00 24.00
70% 100 48 52 36.40 84.40 14.40
Col. 3 = .48 X Col. 2
Col. 4 = Col. 2 - Col. 3
Col. 5 = Col. 4 X Col. 1
Col. 6 = Col. 3 + Col. 5
Col. 7 = Col. 6 - (Col. I X Col. 2)
The additional burden of $41.28 on the 14%-tax-bracket shareholder is 187% greater than the
additional burden of $14.40 borne by the 70%-tax-bracket shareholder. The relative difference be-
tween additional burdens would be even greater if those shareholders subject to the individual in-
come tax at a marginal rate of 0% were considered.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 56.
121. I.R.C. § l(a) (West 1989). The 28% rate applies to an even lower threshold of income for
individual taxpayers who do not file joint returns. Id. § l(b)-(d). As previously indicated, a limited
range of income for certain taxpayers with income above the threshold to which the 28% rate ap-
plies will be subjected to an additional tax of 5% to eliminate the benefit of the lower marginal rate
and exemptions. Id. § l(g); see supra note 54.
122. I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (West 1985) (current version at I.R.C. § l(a) (West 1989)). The threshold
was somewhat lower for taxpayers not filing joint returns but not less than $80,000. Id. § 1 (d)(3)




A low maximum marginal rate also tends to reduce the differential between
the marginal rates faced by all taxpayers. Under prior law, the difference be-
tween the maximum individual rate of fifty percent and the minimum rate of
fourteen percent was thirty-six percent. 124 By contrast, under current law, the
difference between the maximum rate of twenty-eight percent and the minimum
rate of fifteen percent is thirteen percent. 125 This limited range of rates signifi-
cantly reduces the regressive effect of double taxation. Specifically, the addi-
tional burden that double taxation imposes on individual shareholders subject to
the current minimum tax rate is less than twenty percent greater than the addi-
tional burden that double taxation imposes on shareholders subject to the cur-
rent maximum rate.12 6 Thus, both the frequency with which double taxation
has a regressive impact and the magnitude of that impact decline considerably
123. A rough estimate of the percentage of dividend income received by individuals that is sub-
jected to the 28% individual tax rate can be made from government statistics. See STATISTICS OF
INCOME, supra note 107, at 18 (illustrating that 73.8% of all dividends reported by individual tax-
payers in 1984 were received by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $30,000). If the
distribution of dividends by income class is the same today, the foregoing statistic both understates
and overstates the percentage of dividend income subjected to the 28% rate. It understates that
percentage because 3 8.3% of dividends were reported by individuals not filing joint returns who are
subjected to the 28% tax rate at a lower taxable income threshold than $30,000. See I.R.C. § l(b)-
(d) (West 1989). It overstates the percentage of dividend income subjected to the 28% rate because
certain taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $30,000 are likely to have taxable incomes
below $30,000, the threshold at which the 28% marginal rate applies to taxpayers filing joint returns.
Id. § 1(a). One should not overestimate this latter effect, however, since 65.3% of all dividends were
reported by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above $40,000. STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra
note 107, at 18.
The above analysis does not treat individuals subject to the 5% additional tax imposed on a
limited range of income differently from individuals subject to the 28% marginal rate. I.R.C. § l(g)
(West 1989). Even if the 5% additional tax were regarded as a 33% marginal rate, however, its
impact on progressivity is not very different from the 28% rate. See infra note 126.
124. I.R.C. § 1 (West 1985) (current version at I.R.C. § 1 (West 1989)).
125. I.R.C. § 1 (West 1989).
126. The following table (modified from the table in J. PECHMAN, supra note 22, at 180) illus-
trates the regressive impact of a corporate tax imposed at a fiat rate of 34% that is borne entirely by
shareholders when all earnings are paid out as dividends:
Marginal Additional
individual Corporate Dividends Stockholder Total burden of
income income Corporation received by individual tax corporate
tax rate before tax tax at 34% stockholders income tax burden tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
15% $100 $34 $66 $ 9.90 $43.90 $28.90
28% 100 34 66 18.48 52.48 24.48
33% 100 34 66 21.78 55.78 22.78
50% 100 34 66 33.00 67.00 17.00
Col. 3 = .34 X Col. 2
Col. 4 = Col. 2 - Col. 3
Col. 5 = Col. 4 X Col. I
Col. 6 = Col. 3 + Col. 5
Col. 7 = Col. 6 - (Col. 1 X Col. 2)
The $28.90 additional burden imposed on 15% shareholders (Col. 7) is only 18% greater than
the $24.48 additional burden imposed on 28% shareholders (24.48 x 118% = 28.90). Cf. supra note
119 (illustrating that additional burden imposed on low rate shareholders under prior law's wider
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when individual tax rates are low. 12 7
B. Substituting Higher Tax Rates for Double Taxation Is Likely to
Exacerbate Inequities
A more fundamental objection to the progressivity achieved by double taxa-
tion is the view that it would be preferable to impose progressivity explicitly by
utilizing higher marginal individual tax rates. 128 If integration were imple-
mented, it is quite likely that Congress would compensate for the resulting reve-
nue loss by raising individual tax rates. 12 9 Whether higher individual rates
would be a good substitute for double taxation, therefore, is of more than theo-
retical significance.
The corporate tax is a hidden tax. 130 The surreptitious manner in which
the corporate tax adds to the burdens on individuals has engendered much criti-
range of individual tax rates was approximately 187% greater than additional burden imposed on
high rate shareholders).
Even if the additional 5% tax that applies to a narrow range of income of shareholders gener-
ally subject to the 28% rate is treated as a separate 33% marginal rate, the $28.90 additional burden
imposed on shareholders subject the 28% rate is only 27% greater than the $22.78 additional burden
that results from a 33% marginal rate. If the maximum individual marginal rate were restored to
50%, however, the $28.90 additional burden on 15% shareholders would be 70% greater than the
$17.00 additional burden on 50% shareholders. Those dividend recipients subject to a 0% marginal
rate are ignored because fewer than 7% of all dividends reported by individuals were received by
individuals with adjusted gross incomes of less than $10,000. STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note
107, at 18. The $34.00 additional burden (equivalent to corporate tax) imposed on 0% shareholders
is approximately 39% greater than the $24.48 additional burden imposed on 28% shareholders.
127. Critics of double taxation also have argued that the variable impact of the corporate tax is
exacerbated by the ability to defer the individual income tax by accumulating income in the corpora-
tion rather than paying dividends. See McLure, supra note 5, at 539.40. When the corporate rate
approximates the individual tax rate, however, these differences are minimized. See supra notes 44 &
61.
128. See C. McLURE, supra note 5, at 40 ("In theory, almost any degree of progressivity can be
achieved by changing marginal rates. Thus integration ... should be appraised primarily for [its
effect] on horizontal equity .... ").
129. An alternative source of revenue will be needed if integration is implemented. See supra
text accompanying notes 69-73. Enactment of a new tax, such as a value-added tax or a business
transfer tax, seems highly unlikely at the present time. See Leonard, supra note 53, at 977. More-
over, little room remains to increase revenue by base broadening. See Minarik, supra note 42, at
1372. The most likely source of revenue, therefore, is an increase in individual tax rates.
Threats of increasing individual tax rates have been voiced in Congress. See Capital Gains
Battle Royale Shaping Up for House Floor, 44 TAX NOTES 1447, 1447 (1989) (reporting proposal by
House Democrats to increase maximum individual tax rate to 33% in response to proposal by
Republicans to reduce capital gains tax rate); Taxwriters Moving Slowly But Surely on Capital Gains,
supra note 63, at 623 (citing Representative Rostenkowski's earlier threats to increase the maximum
individual tax rate if capital gain rates were lowered); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
REDUCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS (1988) (exploring possibil-
ity of increase in top tax rate to 30% or 33%). Integration is likely to be perceived as benefiting the
wealthy because corporate stock ownership is concentrated among high-income individuals. See
supra note 16. Consequently, it is likely that the quid pro quo for integration would be higher tax
rates for high-income taxpayers.
Even if integration does not lead directly to an increase in individual tax rates, it is likely to
influence this result indirectly because any source of revenue that is used to compensate for the
elimination of double taxation would not be available to satisfy future revenue needs resulting from
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
130. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 7 ("Most taxpayers never know, even approximately,
how much their disposable income is reduced by taxes on corporate profits.").
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cism. t 3 1 It certainly would seem more fair to raise the needed revenue now
generated by the corporate tax directly by imposing higher individual tax rates,
rather than covertly by imposing the corporate tax. 132 Substituting higher indi-
vidual tax rates for double taxation probably would eliminate the horizontal in-
equities that result from the fact that individuals at any given income level do
not derive the same percentage of their incomes from dividends. 133 Although
the elimination of these inequities appears desirable at first, closer analysis
reveals that higher individual tax rates are likely to substitute system-wide hori-
zontal inequities. Higher individual tax rates would impede the ability of the
marketplace to moderate the inequities that result from tax preferences and
probably would reverse the recent trend of reducing the number of preferences
that exist.
When certain investments are taxed more favorably than other investments,
the marketplace generally will operate to equalize the rate of return on a tax-
favored investment with the after-tax rate of return on a comparable fully taxa-
ble alternative.1 34 An example of a tax-favored investment under existing law is
a municipal bond on which the interest income paid is exempt from the individ-
ual income tax. 135 A municipal bond may yield an eight percent return in a
marketplace in which a comparable taxable bond yields ten percent. Under
these circumstances, the marketplace imposes an "implicit tax" on the tax-fa-
vored investment that has the effect of lowering its yield by two percent. 136 If all
individuals were taxed at a rate of twenty percent, the implicit tax on the munic-
ipal bond would eliminate the horizontal inequity otherwise created by the tax-
free alternative. 1 3 7 In this situation, the return derived by purchasers of munici-
pal bonds would be equivalent to the after-tax income of similarly situated indi-
viduals who derived their incomes from other sources. 138
The ability of the marketplace to moderate inequities resulting from prefer-
ences is limited, however, when individuals are subject to different rates of
131. See Klein, supra note 74, at 578-79 ("Similarly disturbing is the opinion offered by some
experts... that the corporate tax can be defended on the ground that it is a good source of reve-
nue-a view that . . . apparently is based upon some well concealed antidemocratic value
judgments.").
132. Query, however, whether an incidence question remains even when the individual income
tax is utilized. See Bittker, supra note 92, at 798.
133. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
134. See Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Intome Tax Avoid-
ance, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 657, 698-701 (1985).
135. See I.R.C. § 103 (West 1989).
136. The implicit tax benefits the issuer of the bond by enabling it to pay a lower rate of interest.
By contrast, the government collects the explicit tax on the taxable bond.
137. See Cooper, supra note 134, at 700-01.
138. The comparison is as follows:
Municipal. Bond Taxable Alternative
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Return 80 100
Less: Tax 0 20
After Tax Return 80 80
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tax. 139 When individuals are taxed at different rates, the magnitude of the bene-
fit derived from the tax-free alternative varies from individual to individual. As
a result, the implicit tax imposed by the marketplace on the tax-free alternative
represents a compromise between the range of potential benefits offered by the
tax-favored investment. For example, if individual tax rates ranged from zero to
forty percent and the average rate was twenty percent, the marketplace in which
a taxable bond yields ten percent still might cause the nontaxable bond to yield
eight percent. Under these circumstances, however, an individual subject to a
forty percent marginal rate who derives income from tax-free bonds will bear a
lesser burden than an individual subject to the same marginal rate who derives
her income from other sources.14° These differences become more pronounced
as the spread between marginal tax rates increases. 141 Higher individual margi-
nal tax rates are likely to cause the range of rates to expand. 142 The horizontal
inequities resulting from higher marginal rates are even more pronounced with
respect to those preferences not subject to the imposition of an implicit tax by
the marketplace. 143
In addition to limiting the equilibrating force of the marketplace with re-
spect to existing preferences, substituting higher marginal rates for double taxa-
tion is likely to lead to the creation of additional preferences that would reverse
the gains in horizontal equity achieved by the recent reform effort. Based on the
manner in which the compromise that led to the 1986 Act was reached,1 44 it is
likely that additional tax preferences would be created if tax rates were in-
creased. As discussed in Part II, liberal interests that desired the elimination of
the myriad of loopholes in the Code achieved their desired end only because they
could appease more conservative interests that found lower marginal tax rates
139. See Yorio, supra note 21, at 406-08.
140. The comparison is as follows:
Municipal Bond Taxable Alternative
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Return 80 100
Less: Tax 0 40
After Tax Return 80 60
Horizontal inequities may not result if the comparison is confined to those who derive income
from capital since utilization of a tax exempt alternative is within their discretion. See Bittker, supra
note 109, at 742-44. Individuals who derive their incomes from labor, however, do not have a tax
exempt alternative. See Yorio, supra note 21, at 401.
141. See Browning, Elasticities, Tax Rates and Tax Revenue, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 45, 52-53 (1989)
(develops quantitative analysis of how higher marginal rates encourage taxpayers to convert re-
sources into nontaxable forms); Yorio, supra note 21, at 407-08.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26. Higher individual tax rates also may increase
tax evasion. See Crane & Nourzad, Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis, 68 REv.
EcoN. STATISTics 217, 221 (1986). Ambiguity exists in this relationship because of certain offset-
ting effects. Allingham & Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, I J. Pun. ECON.
323, 330 (1972) (increase in tax rates makes it more profitable to evade taxes on the margin but also
makes taxpayer less wealthy and, therefore, more averse to high-risk alternatives).
143. See Yorio, supra note 21, at 398-99. For example, the virtually limitless supply of an artifi-
cial entity, such as a trust, prevents demand for these entities from affecting their price via an im-
plicit tax.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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appealing.145 The equitable gains resulting from base broadening would not
have been achieved had the quid pro quo of dramatically lower rates not been
offered. 146 If tax rates were increased, it is likely that pressures would intensify
to restore old preferences and to create new ones.147
In sum, on equitable grounds, double taxation can be defended because it
adds to the progressivity of the individual income tax and criticized because it
results in horizontal inequities. Instinct might suggest that by substituting
higher individual tax rates for double taxation progressivity could be achieved in
a more desirable fashion because the horizontal inequities associated with double
taxation would be eliminated. Substituting higher individual tax rates for double
taxation, however, is likely to limit the equilibrating forces of the marketplace
and upset the political bargain that paved the way for the elimination of many
tax preferences, thereby causing horizontal inequities potentially more profound
than those caused by double taxation.
V. CASE AGAINST DOUBLE TAXATION ON EFFICIENCY GROUNDS
Taxation generally is regarded as inconsistent with economic efficiency to
the extent that it distorts economic decisions.1 48 To minimize the distortions
resulting from taxation, it is desirable to strive for neutrality. Neutrality refers
to a tax system that does not change behavior in the marketplace. 149 To the
extent that double taxation distorts economic decisions, it represents a departure
from neutrality.
The legal literature has identified and analyzed several distortions that it
attributes to double taxation. 150 This literature recognizes that these distortions
are caused to some extent by differences between corporate and individual tax
rates rather than by the double taxation of distributed corporate income.151 As
a result of the 1986 Act, the maximum corporate tax rate, maximum individual
145. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
146. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 4 (stating that 1986 Act wiped out
multitude of special interest tax breaks in return for sharp cuts in tax rates).
147. See Minarik, supra note 42, at 1373 ("a reaction among liberals to raise statutory rates...
would draw more lobbyists from the woodwork; the unraveling process would proceed").
148. The assumption underlying this view, that the economy operates most efficiently when gov-
ernment intervention is minimized, suggests that any tax-induced change in behavior is bad. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1986).
149. A tax system that causes decisions to be made differently from how decisions would be
made on purely economic grounds departs from neutrality. See D. BRADFORD, supra note 78, at
178-79. When this departure occurs, the taxpayer bears a burden in excess of the tax itself. Because
this burden is not offset by a corresponding benefit to the government, the tax creates an inefficiency
(that is, the "excess burden" makes one taxpayer worse off without conferring a corresponding bene-
fit on anyone else). See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 291-300. Neutrality is an
ideal that cannot be achieved on a system-wide basis because distortions are inevitable. The realistic
goal is to minimize, rather than eliminate, the aggregate excess burdens of a tax system. See id. at
311 (acknowledging that some excess burden is inevitable).
150. See Warren, supra note 5, at 721-38; Zolt, supra note 58, at 841-44, 858-68.
151. The magnitude of the distortions created by the biases discussed in this Part differs depend-
ing upon the relationship between the rate at which corporate income, dividends, and capital gains
are taxed. See Warren, supra note 5, at 723-24, 731-33. When these rates are not identical, double
taxation also may bias the desire of shareholders to have corporations retain or distribute their
earnings. See Zolt, supra note 58, at 843-44, 866-68.
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tax rate, and the capital gains rate are closer together than at any time in recent
history.'5 2 In addition, the number of individual marginal rates and the range
of individual and corporate rates have been decreased dramatically. 5 3 Thus, it
is no longer unrealistic to envision a system in which all rates are the same.154
Even if all rates were the same, however, the legal literature claims that
double taxation biases individuals against investing in the corporate sector, bi-
ases corporations against utilizing equity financing, and biases corporations
against making economically profitable investments.' 5 5 Integration is regarded
as a mechanism that would further neutrality by eliminating the distortions at-
tributed to double taxation. 15
6
A. Corporate Tax Biases Individuals Against Investing in Corporate Sector
If equivalent pretax returns can be earned regardless of where an individual
invests capital, 157 returns to capital invested in the corporate sector, which are
taxed twice, obviously bear a heavier burden than returns to capital invested in
an unincorporated enterprise, which are taxed only once.158 For example, if all
capital generates a ten percent pretax return and all income is taxed at a rate of
thirty percent, the tax burdens would be as follows:
Corporate Noncorporate
Investment Investment
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Return (10%) $100 $100
Corporate Tax (30%) $30 0
Return Net of Corp. Tax $70 $100
Individual Tax (30%) $21 $30
Return Net of Individual Tax $49 $70
If shareholders bear the corporate tax, 159 it would be logical for individuals
152. See supra notes 32 & 39.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
154. The restoration of preferential treatment of capital gains, see supra note 63, would mark a
reversal of the trend toward equalizing all rates. A tax system that equalizes corporate, individual,
and capital gains rates still can be viewed as a viable ideal against which to compare the gains
derived from eliminating double taxation. Moreover, the distortions directly attributable to double
taxation can be isolated only if one assumes equivalent tax rates.
A more meaningful rate comparison might be made by comparing effective tax rates rather than
statutory tax rates but this is uncertain in light of the many shortcomings of effective rate analysis.
See generally Bittker, supra note 92, at 780 (highlighting the inadequacies of effective rate analyses).
155. See Warren, supra note 5, at 724, 732-33.
156. See id. at 744-53.
157. This assumption is commonly made. See Warren, supra note 5, at 725; Zolt, supra note 58,
at 860.
158. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (West 1989) (proprietorship); id. § 701 (partnership); id. § 1361 (S Corpo-
rations). Income generated by individual investment in nonbusiness activities also is subject only to
the individual income tax. See id. § 61(a)(4) (interest); id. § 61(a)(5) (rents); id. § 61(a)(6)
(royalties).
159. This assumption generally is made in the legal literature. See Warren, supra note 5, at 725;
Zolt, supra note 58, at 860.
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to favor noncorporate investment over corporate investment. 160 By eliminating
the burden of the corporate tax on distributed corporate income, integration
would equalize the burdens on corporate income and noncorporate income and
thereby eliminate the bias against investing capital in the corporate sector. 161
Thus, those who favor the elimination of double taxation regard the manner in
which the corporate tax biases individuals against investing in the corporate sec-
tor as justification for integration.
B. Corporate Tax Biases Corporations Against Utilizing Equity Financing
If equivalent pretax returns can be earned regardless of how a corporation
finances its investments, 162 investments financed with equity will bear a heavier
tax burden than investments financed with debt. Debt-financed investments
bear a lesser tax burden because interest paid for the use of debt capital is de-
ductible from the corporate tax base,' 63 whereas dividends paid for the use of
equity capital are not deductible. For example, if all investments generate a ten
percent pre-tax return, the cost of both debt capital and equity capital is five
percent, 164 and all income is taxed at a rate of thirty percent, the tax burdens
would be as follows:
Equity
Finance Debt Finance
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Gross Return (10%) $100 $100
Cost of Capital (5%) $50 $50
Return Net of Cost of Capital $50 $50
Corporate Tax (30%) $30165 $15
Return Net of Tax $20 $35
If corporate management endeavors to maximize the amount available for
distribution to shareholders, 1 66 it would be logical for the different tax treatment
to cause corporations to favor debt over equity financing.167 Because integration
160. The economics literature indicates that the disparity in after-tax returns will not be perpetu-
ated because the burden of the corporate tax eventually will be spread among all income from capi-
tal. See infra text accompanying notes 193-96.
161. See Warren, supra note 5, at 744-47.
162. This assumption is commonly made. See Warren, supra note 5, at 725; Zolt, supra note 58,
at 860.
163. I.R.C. § 163 (West 1989).
164. Treating the cost of debt and equity capital as identical is consistent with the legal litera-
ture, which does not take into account different degrees of risk. See Warren, supra note 5, at 724.
165. Because dividends are not deductible, the 30% corporate tax is imposed on the
corporation's pretax gross return of $100.
166. This assumption is made in the legal literature. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5, at 730-31.
Note that the tax savings at the corporate level from debt financing will be offset to some extent by
an increased shareholder-level tax when dividends are paid.
167. When all tax rates are equivalent, retained earnings financing is economically equivalent to
debt financing because retained earnings can be invested without imposition of the deferred share-
holder tax. See Warren, supra note 5, at 731-32 (illustrating equivalence of retained earnings and
debt financing when all tax rates are equal).
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would allow corporations to deduct dividends,168 integration would equalize the
tax burdens on debt and equity capital and thereby eliminate the bias against
equity financing.169 Thus, those who favor the elimination of double taxation
regard the manner in which the corporate tax biases corporations against utiliz-
ing equity financing as justification for integration.
C. Corporate Tax Biases Corporations Against Pursuing Profitable Investment
Opportunities
The beliefs that the corporate tax biases individuals against investing in the
corporate sector and that the corporate tax biases corporations against using
equity are well publicized and commonly cited as bolstering the case for integra-
tion. 170 A more subtle bias created by the corporate tax and one that has re-
ceived far less attention is the bias against the acceptance by corporations of
investment opportunities that would generate an economic profit in the absence
of taxes. 171 Although this anti-investment bias has a lower profile than the other
biases, it is the only bias identified by the legal literature that necessarily indicts
the double taxation of corporate income.172
The bias that the corporate tax creates against corporate investment ex-
tends from the analysis of the bias against equity financing. If one assumes that
corporations have a limited ability to utilize debt financing, 173 the nondeduct-
ibility of the cost of equity capital probably causes corporations to forego invest-
ment opportunities that would generate an economic profit in the absence of
taxes. In the preceding example, a corporation compelled to use equity financ-
ing would not undertake an investment when the cost of equity capital was more
than seven percent even though such an investment would generate an economic
profit in the absence of taxes. The corporation is likely to refrain from undertak-
ing that investment because its inability to deduct the cost of equity capital
would cause the corporation to suffer an after-tax loss from the investment,
notwithstanding the pretax profit. For example, if the cost of equity capital had
been eight percent, the following chart demonstrates that a corporation com-
168. See supra note 104. Although not all integration methods would allow for a deduction of
dividends, the most common methods have the same substantive effect. See Warren, supra note 5, at
775-77.
169. See Warren, supra note 5, at 747-49.
170. See generally Graetz, Tax Aspects of Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Financial Re-
structuring Transactions, 42 TAx NOTEs 721 (1989) (suggesting that corporate tax will influence
leveraging decisions unless corporate earnings on both debt and equity are subjected to identical tax
treatment); Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service
Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57 (1988) (analyzing conceptual
shortcomings of manner in which existing tax system distinguishes enterprises subject to corporate
tax from those exempt from corporate tax); Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat
Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (1989-90) (arguing that refined corporate tax would not
distort individual investment decisions if only publicly traded enterprises were subjected to corporate
tax); Warren, supra note 10, at 715 (advocating integration as solution to bias against equity
financing).
171. See Warren, supra note 5, at 733-35.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 193-205.
173. This assumption is made in the legal literature. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5, at 734-35.
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pelled to use equity capital is unlikely to undertake an investment offering a $20
pretax profit because it results in a $10 after-tax loss:
Equity Finance Debt Finance
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Gross Return (10%) $100 $100
Cost of Capital (8%) $80 $80
Return Net of Cost of Capital $20 $20
Corporate Tax (30%) $30174 $6
Return Net of Tax ($10) $14
Because integration would equalize the tax burden on debt and equity capi-
tal by reducing the burden on equity capital, the bias against undertaking eco-
nomically profitable investments would no longer exist if integration were
adopted. 175 Thus, those who favor the elimination of double taxation regard the
manner in which the corporate tax biases corporations against pursuing profita-
ble investment opportunities as justification for integration.
In sum, the efficiency perspective on double taxation developed in the legal
literature focuses on the biases against individual investment in the corporate
sector, corporate equity financing and corporate investment opportunities.
Those who favor the elimination of double taxation regard integration as desira-
ble because it would eliminate these biases.
VI. CRITIQUE OF EFFICIENCY PERSPECTIVE
The case against double taxation on economic efficiency grounds as devel-
oped in the legal literature is problematic in two respects. First, the legal litera-
ture obscures the fundamental distortion to which the corporate tax contributes.
Second, and more significant, the efficiency perspective developed in the legal
literature focuses on achieving neutrality between corporate income and other
forms of income without regard to the efficiency implications of an alternative
revenue source.
A. Fundamental Distortion Associated With Corporate Tax Is Obscured
The legal literature claims that double taxation biases individuals against
investing in the corporate sector and biases corporations against both utilizing
equity financing and undertaking investments that would generate an economic
profit in the absence of taxes. 176 The first two biases indict the different treat-
ment of similar economic alternatives, not double taxation. The third bias is but
a manifestation of the distortion that results when income from capital is taxed.
174. Because dividends are not deductible, the 30% corporate tax is imposed on the
corporation's pretax gross return of $100.
175. See Warren, supra note 5, at 747-49.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 157-75.
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1. Bias against corporate sector fails to indict corporate tax
Because corporate income is taxed twice and noncorporate investment in-
come is taxed only once, individuals are likely to be biased toward investing
capital outside of the corporate sector. 17 7 Commentators attribute the distortion
to the overtaxation of corporate income; therefore, they advocate integration. 178
The distortion, however, could be attributed just as readily to the undertaxation
of returns to capital invested outside of the corporate sector. Thus, expanding
the burdens of the corporate tax to noncorporate investment income appears as
desirable as adopting integration.
The burdens imposed by the corporate tax might be extended by converting
the corporate tax to a doing-business tax imposed on all business enterprises
irrespective of legal form' 79 or augmenting the individual income tax imposed
on income from capital other than dividends.180 Any approach that results in
identical treatment for income from all forms of capital investment would elimi-
177. But see Ebrill & Hartman, The Corporate Income Tax, Entrepreneurship, and the
Noncorporate Sector, 11 PUB. FiN. Q. 419 (1983) (advancing theory that corporate tax is a tax on
size); Rudnick, supra note 170, at - (arguing that refined corporate tax would not distort invest-
ment decisions if only publicly traded enterprises were subjected to corporate tax because investors
would seek liquidity irrespective of presence of such a tax).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
179. Ifa doing-business tax were imposed on returns to capital invested in an incorporated busi-
ness or an unincorporated business, all capital generated a 10% pretax return, and all income were
taxed at a rate of 30%, the tax burdens on income from capital would be identical regardless of
where the capital was invested:
Corporate Noncorporate
Investment Investment
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pre-Tax Return (10%) $100 $100
Doing Business Tax (30%) $30 $30
Return Net of Corp. Tax $70 $70
Individual Tax (30%) $21 $21
Return Net of Indiv. Tax $49 $49
Although the concept of a doing-business tax is not novel, it generally has been suggested as a
substitute for, rather than as a supplement to, the individual income tax imposed on business income
of unincorporated enterprises. See Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organiza-
tion: Is It Timefor a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249, 260-63 (1961); Jacobs, supra note
104, at I. But see ABA & NYSBA, supra note 47, at 260 ("You could have an unincorporated
business tax, if you think something ought to be subject to two taxes and it's not in corporate
form."). Although it is difficult to imagine how a two-tiered regime would operate with respect to
capital invested in a proprietorship or a passive investment (such as a bank deposit), the feasibility of
such an approach has yet to be analyzed. See infra note 183.
180. If all income is taxed at the same rate, the burden of double taxation could be simulated by
imposing the individual tax on income from capital other than dividends at a rate equal to l-[(l-rate)
x (1-rate)]. For example, if all capital generates a 10% pretax return, all income (other than nondivi-
dend capital income) is taxed at a rate of 30%, and nondividend capital income is taxed at a rate of
51% [1 - (.7 x .7)], the tax burdens on income from capital would be identical regardless of where the
capital was invested:
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nate the distortion.' 8 1 It is only because taxing income from capital creates
other distortions 182 that curtailing the scope of the corporate tax might be pref-
erable to expanding its scope. 183 Thus, the bias against individual investment in
the corporate sector does not indict double taxation per se, but rather indicts the
different tax treatment of investment in the corporate sector and investment in
the noncorporate sector.
2. Bias against equity financing fails to indict corporate tax
Interest is deductible from the base on which the corporate tax is imposed,
but dividends are not deductible from that base; therefore, corporations may be
biased toward financing investments with debt rather than equity capital.' 84
Although the legal literature attributes this distortion to the overtaxation of cor-
porate income disbursed as dividends,' 8 5 the distortion could be attributed just
as readily to the undertaxation of corporate income disbursed as interest.
Expanding the corporate tax base by not allowing corporations to deduct
interest payments would neutralize the bias against equity financing as effec-
tively as curtailing the corporate tax base by allowing a deduction for divi-
dends. 186 Indeed, any approach that results in identical tax treatment of the
cost of all forms of capital would neutralize the distortion. For example, a de-
duction might be allowed for a fixed, identical percentage of both interest and
Corporate Noncorporate
Investment Investment
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Return (10%) $100 $100
Corporate Tax (30%) $30 0
Return Net of Corp. Tax $70 $100
Individual Tax (30%) $21 (51%) $51
Return Net of Indiv. Tax $49 $49
The possibility of subjecting income from unincorporated enterprises to a higher individual
income tax than dividend income has been acknowledged. See Brooks, A Proposal to Avert the Reve-
nue Loss from "Disincorporation, " 36 TAx NOTES 425, 425 (1987) (proposing to impose surtax on
the income of pass-through entities).
181. See McLure, supra note 5, at 545 ("[lIt might be suggested that if capital is to be taxed more
heavily than labor, the capital tax should be levied at the same rate on all capital, regardless of its
use."). The criticisms McLure lodges toward this suggestion focus on a rate differential rather than
the corporate tax itself. See id. at 545-46.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 197-203.
183. Whether curtailing the corporate tax is indeed desirable depends on how the efficiency im-
plications of double taxation compare to those of an alternative revenue source. See infra text ac-
companying notes 207-14.
Aside from the overtaxation of income from capital, curtailing the scope of the corporate tax
also may be favored because of the belief that it would not be possible to develop a system that would
cause capital income from all sources to bear equal tax burdens. See supra notes 179-80 and accom-
panying text. This conclusion is premature, however, because little attention has been devoted to the
possibility of developing such a system.
184. For a list of factors that may limit the extent to which debt financing will be favored over
equity financing, see Zolt, supra note 58, at 843.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
186. For example, if all investments generate a 10% pretax return, the cost of both debt capital
and equity capital is 5%, all income is taxed at a rate of 30%, and neither interest nor dividends are
deductible, then the following equivalent tax burdens would result from either method of finance:
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dividend payments. 187 It is only because taxing income from capital creates its
own distortions1 88 that curtailing the corporate tax base might be preferable to
expanding that base.189 Thus, the bias against equity financing does not indict
double taxation, but instead indicts the different tax treatment of interest and
dividends.
3. Bias against corporate investment is manifestation of taxing
income from capital
Corporations are likely to forego investment opportunities that would gen-
erate an economic profit in the absence of taxes because the cost of equity capital
is not deductible.190 In contrast to the biases against individual investment in
Equity Finance Debt Finance
Amount Invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax Gross Return (10%) $100 $100
Cost of Capital (5%) $50 $50
Return Net of Cost of Capital $50 $50
Corporate Tax (30%) $30 $30
Return Net of Tax $20 $20
For a proposal to eliminate the deduction for interest on corporate debt, see Warren, The Cor-
porate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585 (1974). See also J. PECHMAN,
supra note 22, at 183 (acknowledging disallowance of interest deduction as neutralizing mechanism);
House Taxwriters End LBO Hearings; Prospects of Bill This Year Unclear, 43 TAx NOTES 930, 930
(1989) (reporting proposal by Columbia law professor Louis Lowenstein not to permit deductions
for dividends or interest payments). Professor Warren subsequently rejected his proposal because it
would add to the manner in which the corporate tax biases corporations against making economi-
cally profitable investments. Warren, supra note 5, at 734 & n.43.
To achieve complete neutrality, it also would be necessary to increase the tax burden on re-
tained earnings. See Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
1057, 1071 (1984) ("[M]aybe interest deductions should be disallowed. But one important disadvan-
tage of that course is that it would introduce a substantial discrepancy in cost of capital, favoring
accumulated equity over debt."); supra note 167.
187. See Graetz, supra note 170, at 724 (advocating shareholder tax credit for some portion or
all of the corporate tax paid on earnings distributed as interest or dividends in lieu of corporate
interest deduction); The Outlook- Corporate Debt Rises Despite Worries, Wall St. J., June 26, 1989, at
Al, col. 5 (referencing Joint Committee on Taxation option that would allow companies to deduct
only 60% of their interest payments but allow a new deduction for 60% of dividends).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 197-203.
189. Whether curtailing the corporate tax is indeed desirable depends on how the efficiency im-
plications of double taxation compare to. those of an alternative revenue source. See infra text ac-
companying notes 207-14.
190. It is unclear, however, that allowing a deduction for the cost of equity capital would neces.
sarily increase investment. If all firms demanded additional investment, the increase in demand for
investment could drive up the price of financing to the point where the increased pretax cost of
capital would offset part or all of the tax savings derived from deductibility. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFIcE, supra note 42, at 63-64. For example, a corporation utilizing equity capital to
finance an investment generating a pretax return of 10%, when the cost of capital was 8% and all
taxes were imposed at a rate of 30%, would not undertake the investment if the cost of equity capital
were not deductible. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75. If the cost of equity capital were
deductible and the additional demand for investment increased the cost of capital to 11%, the corpo-
ration still would not undertake the investment:
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the corporate sector and corporate equity financing, 19 1 the bias against corpo-
rate investment opportunities can be neutralized only by curtailing the corporate
tax. The bias against corporate investment opportunities is the only bias identi-
fied by the legal literature that necessarily indicts the double taxation of corpo-
rate income. 192
Framing the case against double taxation on efficiency grounds in terms of
the impact of the corporate tax on corporate investment opportunities still ob-
scures the fundamental distortion to which double taxation contributes. This
fundamental distortion inevitably results from a system that taxes income from
capital.
B. Taxation of Income from Capital is Root of Distortion Created by
Corporate Tax
The prevailing view among economists is that the burden of the corporate
tax is shared by all owners of capital.' 9 3 Imposing the corporate tax only on
capital invested in the corporate sector attracts capital to noncorporate invest-
ments because those investments initially offer a higher after-tax rate of return.
As a result of the influx of additional capital into the noncorporate sector, the
pretax rate of return offered by that sector eventually falls to the point at which
both the corporate sector and the noncorporate sector offer investors equivalent
after-tax rates of return. The process by which returns to capital are equalized
distorts the allocation of capital between the corporate sector and the
noncorporate sector. 194 As explained above, this "intersectoral" distortion need
not be attributed to double taxation. 195 Rather, this distortion is attributable to
taxing capital invested in the corporate sector differently from capital invested
outside of the corporate sector. 196
Equity Finance
Amount Invested $1,000
Pretax Gross Return (10%) $100
Cost of Capital (11%) $110
Return Net of Cost of Capital ($10)
Corporate Tax (30%)
Return Net of Tax ($10)
191. See supra text accompanying notes 177-89.
192. It may not be necessary to eliminate the corporate tax to neutralize even this bias because
that part of the corporate tax base that represents a "pure" profit can be taxed without distorting
economic decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 215-21.
193. See Feldstein, supra note 13, at 38 ("The assumption that 100% of the corporate tax in-
crease is borne by capital and that all capital bears that tax increase equally .. .[probably] has
become the conventional wisdom among most public finance specialists.").
194. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 283-85. This view is known as the
"Harberger view." See supra note 92. The desire to invest capital in the corporate sector will not
always be deterred by the imposition of additional burdens on tfiat capital-for instance, in certain
cases the demand for corporateness may be inelastic. See Ebrill & Hartman, supra note 177, at 419;
Rudnick, supra note 170, at -.
195. The distortion created by the process of equalizing returns to capital in both the corporate
sector and the noncorporate sector is referred to in the economics literature as an "inter~ectoral"
distortion. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 73-82.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 177-83.
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Even if the corporate tax were designed to fall evenly on all income from
capital, 197 however, the economics literature recognizes that such a tax would be
distorting simply because it taxes income from capital. 198 A tax on income from
capital affects the decisions individuals make about the timing of their consump-
tion. 199 Because a tax on income from capital lowers the after-tax rate of return
on an investment, it operates to encourage individuals to consume currently
rather than to save for future consumption. 2° ° The corporate tax is but a con-
tributing factor to this "intertemporal" distortion.20 1 Even in the absence of the
corporate tax, the individual income tax imposed on income from capital (inter-
est, dividends, rents) would affect consumption and savings decisions. 20 2 The
corporate tax therefore imposes an additional burden on income from capital.203
Existing legal literature fails to recognize explicitly that to the extent the
corporate tax operates as a tax on all income from capital, the corporate tax
distorts consumption and savings decisions.2°4 This "intertemporal" distortion
alone might appear to justify integration on efficiency grounds. Integration
probably would reduce the extent to which the existing tax structure modifies
consumption and savings decisions-if it were not necessary to compensate for
the revenue loss from integration.20 5
197. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
198. See generally Feldstein, supra note 18, at 29 (elaborating on distortions created by any tax
on income from capital).
199. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 82-84; Feldstein, supra note 18, at 34-37. The distor-
tions created by a tax on income from capital have led some to conclude that a tax on expenditures
would be preferable to a tax on income. See supra note 76.
200. For example, if the rate of interest is 10% and no tax is imposed, one might be indifferent
between consuming $100 of a particular good currently or $110 of a similar good next year. Ifa tax
of 20% on income from capital is imposed, the good that can be consumed for $100 this year be-
comes more attractive than the good that can be consumed for $110 next year because one would
need to save more than $100 ($101.85) to afford the l10 good next year. As a result, one would
expect current consumption to increase and savings to decline. At the same time, however, a tax on
income from capital makes future consumption more expensive. Thus, individuals will need to save
more to satisfy future consumption plans. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 84. It is uncertain,
therefore, whether a tax on income from capital increases or reduces aggregate savings. Compare
Boskin, Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL. EcON. 3, 3 (1978) (finding direct
relationship between savings and the interest rate) with Weber, Interest Rates, Inflation and Con-
sumer Expenditure, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 843, 843 (1975) (finding inverse relationship between sav-
ings and the interest rate). Regardless of the impact of a tax on income from capital on the level of
savings, such a tax is distorting simply because it changes the time at which individuals consume.
See Feldstein, supra note 18, at 34-37.
201. The distortion created by the corporate tax by virtue of being a tax on income from capital
that distorts consumption and savings decisions is referred to in the economics literature as an "in-
tertemporal" distortion. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 82-88.
202. The individual income tax applies to income from capital and to income from labor. I.R.C.
§ 61(a) (West 1989). That part of the individual income tax that applies to income from labor also is
distortionary. See infra text accompanying note 225.
203. See Feldstein, supra note 18, at 4647. For a technical discussion touching upon the rela-
tionship between the corporate-level investment bias focused on in the legal literature and the more
general individual-level consumption/savings distortion focused on in the economics literature, see J.
BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 82-84.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
205. Integration may not necessarily be beneficial since double taxation is one of many distor-
tions imposed by the tax system and the impact of one distortion in the presence of many others may
be significantly different from the impact of one distortion where no other distortions exist. See J.
BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 79-80; Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 80, at 74.
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Because an alternative revenue source would have to finance the revenue
loss from integration, 206 integration will further neutrality on a system-wide ba-
sis only if the alternative revenue source creates distortions less severe than those
existing under double taxation. The legal literature generally has not considered
the efficiency implications of an alternative revenue source. Therefore, the case
against double taxation developed in that literature is incomplete.
C. Efficiency Implications of Alternative Revenue Source Must Be Assessed
Neutrality becomes a relative goal once it is acknowledged that a given
amount of revenue must be raised through taxes. 2° 7 If taxes are inevitable, some
distortions must be tolerated.208 The tax reform goal must be to minimize on a
system-wide basis the adverse impact on efficiency of a tax system required to
raise a given amount of revenue. 20 9 In other words, the gains in efficiency de-
rived from eliminating a source of revenue must be weighed against the losses in
efficiency incurred by a compensatory change to determine whether reform is
desirable. 210 It is likely that the revenue loss from integration would be financed
through higher individual taxes. 211 Legal literature for the most part ignores
the impact of this or any other alternative revenue source on efficiency. 212 In
contrast, economics literature that examines the efficiency implications of inte-
gration does consider the efficiency costs of substituting higher individual taxes
for double taxation. 213 Although economic studies performed prior to the 1986
Act suggest that some efficiency gain might be derived from substituting higher
206. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
207. If revenue need did not constrain tax reform, neutrality could be achieved simply by elimi-
nating all taxes. See supra note 149.
208. Tax revenues might be generated in a manner that is not distorting by imposing an
equivalent dollar amount of tax on every living individual, but such a tax would be unacceptable
from an equity standpoint. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 291; see Atkinson &
Stiglitz, supra note 80, at 63. For a discussion of the possibility that some part of the corporate tax
may not be distorting, see infra text accompanying notes 215-21.
209. See generally Feldstein, supra note 13, at 90 ("[A] comprehensive income tax is itself a
distortionary tax and therefore an inefficient tax. The problem is to select the set of tax rates.., on
different sources of income that minimizes inefficiency or maximizes welfare."). Equity considera-
tions also limit the ability to maximize efficiency. See supra note 208.
210. The economics literature consistently has recognized the need to balance the gains in effi-
ciency from a revenue losing proposal against the efficiency costs associated with an alternative
revenue source. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 80, at 60; Feldstein, supra note 13, at 79-80;
Sandmo, Optimal Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 37, 40 (1976).
211. See supra note 129. If the revenue loss from integration were financed by a new tax, such as
a value-added tax, rather than an increase in individual income taxes, the inefficiencies associated
with the new tax would have to be considered. It is possible that a new tax, simply because of its
newness, would result in more significant distortions than a more traditional revenue source.
212. See Warren, supra note 5, at 725, 770 (comparing individual investment distortions created
by double taxation to the result that would prevail in the absence of taxation and suggesting that if
the revenue cost of integration is objectionable, it might be reduced by partially integrating taxes).
Indeed, the legal literature has been critical of justifying double taxation on revenue grounds. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
213. See Chang, Optimal Taxation of Business and Individual Incomes, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 251,
252 (1988); Feldstein, supra note 18, at 46-48; Fullerton, King, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 18, at
677. See generally J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 82 n.16 ("Since virtually any tax causes some
inefficiency, the inefficiency caused by whatever tax might be used in place of the corporation income
tax must be taken into account in a final evaluation of the corporate tax with respect to efficiency.").
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individual taxes and integration for double taxation, 2 14 fundamental reasons ex-
ist for believing that it may not be desirable to transfer existing burdens from the
corporate tax to the individual income tax.
D. Transferring Burdens from Corporate Tax to Individual Income Tax May
Be Undesirable
From an efficiency standpoint, it may be undesirable to adopt integration at
the cost of higher individual income taxes for several reasons. First, double tax-
ation may entail an element that does not distort economic decisions. By con-
trast, the individual income tax does not share this element. Second,
substituting higher individual income taxes for double taxation will yield effi-
ciency gains only if existing tax burdens are shifted from capital to labor, a mea-
sure that would be inconsistent with maintaining progressivity. Finally, at this
point in time, an income tax system that utilizes multiple, low rate, broad-based
taxes is a realistic goal. It may be more productive from an efficiency standpoint
to refine that system than to jeopardize the gains derived from such a system by
increasing individual income taxes to pay for integration.
1. Eliminating double taxation sacrifices element that does not distort
When a tax is imposed on a quality that is desired irrespective of the tax,
the tax will not distort economic decisions. 21 5 Certain income derived from cap-
ital should be desired by owners of capital regardless of whether that income is
taxed. Specifically, any return that exceeds the minimum return that an investor
would accept for the use of that investor's capital should be desired regardless of
how heavily that excess return might be taxed. In this regard, the minimum
return ("normal" profit) acceptable to an investor must be differentiated from
any additional return ("pure" profit) generated by an investment. 216 The pure
profit is a bonus that can be taxed away without encouraging the individual
investor to spend rather than to save.217
Quite clearly, the existing corporate tax base represents more than a pure
214. See Feldstein, supra note 18, at 46-48; Fullerton, King, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 18, at
77. These commentators do acknowledge that gains in efficiency will be substantially reduced where
revenue neutrality is achieved by increasing individual tax rates. See Feldstein, supra note 18, at 41
(stating that gains in efficiency from eliminating tax on capital income are reduced and may be
negative if revenue must be recovered by a higher rate of tax on capital income); Fullerton, King,
Shoven & Whalley, supra note 18, at 690 (stating that potential gains under integration from re-
moval of intertemporal distortions would be reduced significantly if marginal income tax rates are
increased); infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text. The efficiency gain emerging from the Feld-
stein study also would be reduced if a tax on capital income caused an increase in savings. See J.
BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 84-85; supra note 200.
215. The demand for a quality that remains desirable regardless of the extent to which it is taxed
is said to be "inelastic." A commodity for which demand is inelastic, "is an ideal object of taxation
from an efficiency point of view." Sandmo, supra note 210, at 45; see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUS-
GRAVE, supra note 8, at 295 ("Excess burden is absent wherever surplus can be isolated out as a base
of taxation.").
216. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 20.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203 (generally tax on income from capital encour-
ages taxpayers to consume currently rather than save).
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profit. 2 18 No deduction is allowed to a corporation for any payments made with
respect to an equity investor's capital; therefore, at least a part of the base on
which the corporate tax is imposed represents a normal profit.2 19 Imposition of
the corporate tax on the normal profit on equity capital distorts consumption
and savings decisions.220 By eliminating the double taxation of corporate in-
come in its entirety, however, integration would do more than eliminate the
inefficiencies created by subjecting this normal profit to double taxation. It also
would eliminate the part of the corporate tax that applies to the pure profit,
which is not distortionary. 221
Unlike the corporate tax, which represents a tax on capital, 222 the individ-
ual income tax taxes both capital and labor.223 In other words, the individual
income tax taxes not only income from capital but also income derived by indi-
vidual wage earners. If integration were financed through higher individual
taxes, a tax imposed on income from both capital and labor would be substituted
for the corporate tax that falls only on capital. 224 That part of the individual
income tax that applies to labor, however, does not share the neutral element of
218. The pure profit has been illustrated by assuming that corporations can finance all invest-
ment with debt. The "normal" profit attributable to debt financing would be represented by the
interest rate that the corporation must pay on the borrowed funds. Any taxable income that remains
after the payment of interest represents a "pure" profit because interest is deductible from the corpo-
rate tax base. See I.R.C. § 163 (West 1989); King, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the
Cost of Capital-A Comment, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 271 (1975); Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PUB.
ECON. 303 (1976); Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital,.2 J. PUB.
ECON. 1 (1973).
219. The cost of equity financing tends to be associated with dividends. Dividends are not de-
ductible. Equity investors also are compensated by the appreciation in stock that results from re-
tained earnings. Part or all of this appreciation also may represent a cost of equity capital. It is
difficult, therefore, to quantify the normal profit associated with equity capital.
220. The entire corporate tax may operate to raise revenue in a fashion that does not distort after
the risk of uncertainty is taken into account. By taxing income from capital, the government absorbs
a part of the expected return from capital. It also absorbs a part of the uncertainty in that return.
The fact that the investor bears less risk may compensate for the lower expected return caused by the
tax. See Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax Distortions, 100
Q.J. ECON. I (No. 1, 1985).
221. Professor Andrews, as Reporter for the American Law Institute, has long advocated refin-
ing the corporate tax base to allow a deduction for the cost of new equity capital. See AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFT 88-97 (1989);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 356-401. Although this ALI proposal does not em-
brace the pure-profits view of the corporate tax specifically, it is consistent with that view. See
Warren, supra note 5, at 760. Professor Andrews believes that the ALI proposal would entail a
lesser revenue cost and a smaller redistributional impact than integration. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 331. The actual revenue cost of the proposal has not been quantified.
See id. at 398-99. It would be productive to quantify the revenue effect of all of the proposals in the
ALI Subchapter C Study to determine whether those proposals together would lose revenue. If the
ALI proposals would lose revenue, any gains in equity and efficiency resulting from those proposals
would be offset by the costs in equity and efficiency of a compensatory revenue source.
222. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
223. See I.R.C. § 61 (West 1989).
224. The efficiency critique follows the incidence assumption made in the economics literature(that the corporate tax is borne by all owners of capital) because the heart of the case against double
taxation on efficiency grounds is developed in the economics literature. See supra notes 197-203 and
accompanying text. But see supra note 115 (equity critique follows incidence assumption generally
made by those arguing for integration on equitable grounds; namely, that shareholders bear the
corporate tax). It is possible that part or all of the burden of the corporate tax may be shifted to
labor through wage reductions and by price increases of consumer goods. See supra note 92.
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a tax on capital. Rather, taxing labor income distorts the decisions individuals
make between work and leisure because the benefits derived from leisure are
outside the scope of the individual income tax base.225 Consequently, to substi-
tute higher individual taxes for double taxation would be to replace, in part, a
distorting tax on labor income for the present tax on capital income (a part of
which is not distorting). System-wide efficiency currently may be furthered by
double taxation, therefore, notwithstanding the disproportionate burden double
taxation imposes on capital income.226
2. Eliminating element of double taxation that distorts is
inconsistent with progressivity
The corporate tax distorts savings and consumption decisions because it
represents a tax on capital income.2 27 Because a part of the individual income
tax is imposed on income from capital, gains in efficiency will not be achieved if
the burden imposed by the corporate tax is transferred to that part of the indi-
vidual income tax that applies to capital. Substituting higher individual tax
rates for double taxation might simply convert a hidden burden on income from
capital to an overt burden on that income, because much of the income derived
by high-income individuals is from capital rather than labor.228 Consequently,
if integration is to be financed with higher individual income taxes, efficiency
considerations dictate that the increase in individual income taxes be designed to
transfer to labor the burden that the corporate tax currently imposes on capi-
tal.229 At least one group of commentators has acknowledged that the greatest
gains in efficiency would be achieved if integration were compensated for "by
taxing the poor who do not save" because taxing the poor would not distort the
decisions individuals make between consumption and savings. 230 Even if such a
shift in tax burdens were desirable from an efficiency standpoint, it might be
objectionable on equitable grounds because it represents a significant departure
225. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 87, at 79; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at
294; Feldstein, supra note 18, at 31-32.
226. See Chang, supra note 213, at 262-63. Chang concludes that even when a business income
tax does not allow dividends to be deducted from taxable income, efficiency requires both a business
income tax and a personal income tax. Id. at 262. He acknowledges that reducing the burden on
distributed corporate income deserves further investigation but demonstrates that it is not a foregone
conclusion that efficiency gains would be derived by shifting this burden to the individual income
tax. See id. at 263. Chang's study implies that earlier economic studies that derived a welfare gain
by shifting the burden of the corporate tax to the individual income tax did not focus adequately on
the pure profit element of the corporate tax. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
228. See Fullerton, King, Thomas & Whalley, supra note 18, at 690 ("the potential gains under
integration from removal of intertemporal distortions would be significantly reduced if marginal
income tax rates are raised").
229. See Feldstein, supra note 18, at 48 ("This [study] reinforces the traditional case for eliminat-
ing the corporate income tax if that can be done in a way that removes the excess taxation of capital
income." (emphasis added)).
230. Fullerton, King, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 18, at 690 ("[The dynamic results...
suggest significant potential gains from corporate tax integration, provided replacement taxes do not
excessively interfere with intertemporal consumption choice.... [Tihe largest intertemporal gain
could be secured by taxing the poor who do not save.").
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from the progressivity of the tax system that presently exists. 2 31
3. Multiple broad-based, low rate taxes may further efficiency
more than integration
The 1986 Act suggests that a tax system that entails a broad-based individ-
ual income tax and a broad-based corporate tax, both of which are imposed at
the same low rate, is an obtainable goal. Quite clearly, however, that ideal has
not yet been achieved; the highest corporate rate exceeds the highest individual
rate by six percent and neither the corporate tax nor the individual tax is im-
posed at a flat rate.2 32 Nevertheless, the existing tax system approaches that
broad-based, low rate ideal to a greater extent than many ever thought possible.
A tax system that entails broad-based individual and corporate taxes im-
posed at identical low rates is desirable from an efficiency standpoint. To the
extent that the two taxes operate independently, the breadth of each tax base
and the single low rate minimize the potential for each tax to distort economic
decisions. 233 To the extent that the two taxes operate in the alternative-when
the choice is between undistributed corporate income and some other form of
income-even the integrationists acknowledge that equivalent rates will mini-
mize differences that otherwise would be distorting.234 Distributed corporate
income will continue to bear a heavier burden than other forms of income under
this system. Yet, broad-based taxes imposed at identical low rates also have a
prophylactic effect on the overtaxation of distributed corporate income because
this system of taxation reduces the difference, in absolute terms, between the tax
burden on distributed corporate income and the burden on other forms of
income.235
If the overtaxation of distributed corporate income is eliminated by increas-
ing individual tax rates, the gains in efficiency derived from the broad-based, low
rate ideal will be jeopardized. History as well as reason suggest that higher mar-
ginal rates are likely to augment the difference between the highest and lowest
individual tax rates.236 As the range of rates expands, the distortions created by
existing preferences will be accentuated.2 37 Moreover, higher rates are likely to
231. See supra note 17; supra notes 106-47 and accompanying text.
232. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (West 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 54-56. Some additional
base broadening also might be desirable.
233. See R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 173 (stating that a tax on business income designed to
treat different firms equally is desirable from neutrality standpoint); Fullerton & Mackie, Economic
Efficiency in Recent Tax Reform History: Policy Reversals or Consistent Improvements?, 42 NAT'L
TAX J. 1 (1989) (noting several measures of economic efficiency that are enhanced by lower marginal
tax rates); Minarik, supra note 42, at 1373 (acknowledging that low rates spread the burden of
government thinly); Yorio, supra note 21, at 440 ("The reduction in marginal tax rates may make
taxpayers less inclined to substitute leisure for work. In making investment decisions, taxpayers will
be less likely to pursue tax objectives both because of lower marginal rates and because of the elimi-
nation (or restriction) of various tax preferences.").
234. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 134-43.
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intensify pressures to restore old preferences and create new ones.2 38 In addi-
tion, the ability to generate additional revenues from higher rates may be lim-
ited.239 Therefore, it may be more productive from an efficiency standpoint to
endeavor to refine the reform theme of multiple low rate, broad-based taxes than
to jeopardize the gains in efficiency resulting from reform by adopting integra-
tion and increasing individual taxes.24 °
VII. CONCLUSION
The view that the double taxation of corporate income is undesirable is well
established. It is difficult to quarrel with that view because double taxation en-
tails a departure from the ideals of horizontal equity and efficiency. These de-
partures, however, are prescriptive of the elimination of double taxation only if
revenue needs and progressivity are ignored.
No realistic tax ever will achieve perfect horizontal equity or efficiency.
Rather, a given amount of revenue must be raised in a manner that furthers
equity and efficiency while maintaining the distribution of tax burdens among
income classes that society desires. Before double taxation can be judged as
good or bad, one must weigh the gains from the elimination of double taxation
against the losses that would result from whatever mechanism is utilized to en-
sure revenue neutrality.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 demonstrates that a tax system utilizing mul-
tiple, flat rate, broad-based taxes is a feasible goal. Such a tax system not only
minimizes inequities on a system-wide basis, it also minimizes the magnitude of
the extra burden imposed by the double taxation of corporate income. Eliminat-
ing double taxation in the face of a revenue constraint likely would lead to an
individual income tax increase that would undermine the gains in equity and
efficiency derived from the 1986 Act. Moreover, to further efficiency, such a tax
increase must be designed to shift tax burdens from capital to labor. It is not
apparent that such a shift is desirable from a social policy standpoint.
The case against double taxation, therefore, is not as clear as instinct and
existing legal literature suggest. At the present time, moving further toward a
tax system that imposes multiple, flat rate taxes appears to be more productive
than jeopardizing progress toward that goal by compensating for integration.
The ability of double taxation to help finance a multiple, fiat rate tax system,
238. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
239. When tax rates rise above some undetermined level, productive activity may decline to the
point at which less tax revenue will be generated than would be the case if lower rates were utilized,
See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 304-07; Fullerton, On the Possibility of an
Inverse Relationship Between Tax Rates and Government Revenues, 19 J. Pua. ECON. 3, 3-22 (1982),
For an argument that current rates may be closer to the revenue maximizing level than previously
believed, see Browning, supra note 141, at 56.
240. See Chang, supra note 213, at 262-63 (finding that efficiency requires both corporate tax and
individual income tax, that individual tax rates should be markedly reduced, and that integration
should be considered, but is not preordained); see also Surrey, Reflections on "Integration"ofCorpo.
ration andIndividual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335, 340 (1975) ("W]hile the economists may
plant their integration flag on allocation of resources, the Congress should not follow in their
path.... The uncertainties surrounding the effects on allocation of resources are hardly the base to
support a major change in the United States tax system .... ").
[Vol. 68
1990] CORPORATE TAX 657
along with the progressivity derived from double taxation, very well may out-
weigh the costs double taxation imposes on horizontal equity and efficiency.

